


# ICMA Workshop: Professional Repo and Collateral Management 1-2 June 2017



## **Welcome to delegates from ICMA and ERCC**

Godfried De Vidts, Chairman of ICMA's ERCC Committee

## **Welcome to delegates from UBS**

Gareth Allen, Global Head of Asset Sourcing and Optimization –  
Group ALM, UBS





# **The repo instrument: legal, economic and operational character**

Richard Comotto, ICMA Centre at Reading University

# **Professional Repo & Collateral Management Course**

*The repo instrument: legal, economic, operational character*

**Richard Comotto**  
**ICMA Centre**  
**University of Reading**  
**United Kingdom**

# repo instrument

- name
- basic mechanics
- terminology
- legal structure
- economic operation
- core uses
- legal structure v economic operation
  - do you understand repo?
  - accounting for repo
- things like repo
- risk on repo --- credit, liquidity, operational, legal

# name

- what is the origin of the name?

name





name


repossession



# basic mechanics



# basic mechanics



# basic mechanics

- if seller defaults, buyer can make himself whole by liquidating assets, which therefore act as “collateral”
- what makes good collateral?
  - default risk-free
  - liquid
    - easy to value
    - easy to liquidate


# basic mechanics

- if seller defaults, buyer can make himself whole by liquidating assets, which therefore act as “collateral”
- what makes good collateral?
  - default risk-free
  - liquid
    - easy to value
    - easy to liquidate

} usually government securities




# basic mechanics




operationally = two transactions


# terminology




# terminology



# terminology




# terminology





# terminology




# terminology

## definitions in GMRA 2000

- **purchased securities**
  - delivered by seller at the start
  - includes substitute securities
- **equivalent securities**
  - delivered by buyer after the purchase date
- **purchase price** --- paid by buyer at start
  - used to describe amount
  - purchase price of sell/buy-back is defined differently
- **repurchase price** --- purchase price + repo interest owed or paid by seller
  - used to describe amount
  - usually thought of as payment at end but a repurchase price can be calculated each day during term of repo

# terminology



# legal structure

- repo is a **sale** of a quantity of assets & simultaneous agreement to **repurchase** the same quantity of equivalent assets at a future date or on demand for original value plus a return on the use of cash
- **quantity** means same **nominal** amount, redemption value, face value or number of securities
- **equivalent** means:
  - economically but not legally identical
  - definition in GMRA [2(t)]:
    - same issuer, part of same issue, identical type, identical description
    - identical nominal value
    - identical amount unless otherwise agreed
    - equivalent property after corporate event [GMRA 2(t)(B)]
    - notwithstanding redenomination into EUR [GMRA 2(t)(A)]
  - definitions in other master agreements:
    - “same or similar” [EMA]
    - “substantially the same” [MRA]

# legal structure


- immediate sale & future repurchase of collateral means a **true sale** & outright **transfer of legal & beneficial title** to collateral to the buyer
- seller gives up:
  - proprietary rights in collateral in exchange for rights against counterparty
  - right to the return of the very same collateral --- buys back **equivalent** assets
- buyer acquires
  - legal title means unencumbered right of use
  - beneficial title means rights to benefits of ownership = coupons, dividends, corporate actions, voting rights



# legal structure

## why not give a **security interest** in the collateral?

- usually a pledge
- borrower generally retains ownership
- secured lender has limited property rights --- customarily, only right to dispose of secured collateral in event of bankruptcy



# legal structure

## why not give a **security interest** in the collateral?

- security interests are subject to the statutory insolvency process
  - security interests need to be validated by fulfilling formalities called 'perfection' requirements
  - in a default, the insolvency court will typically impose:
    - **stays on enforcement** of rights to collateral
    - **claw-backs** of transfers suspected of being fraudulent or giving undue preference pre-bankruptcy
    - limitations on 'ipso facto' clauses such as insolvency being event of default
    - restrictions on method of disposal of collateral
- in most jurisdictions, security interests are therefore likely to be contested, expensive & uncertain, making them unsuitable for collateralising money market (short term) transactions

# legal structure

## why **transfer title** to collateral?

- buyer has more certain control over collateral than security interest --- reduces credit risk
- buyer has automatic right to re-sell collateral during the term of the repo --- reduces liquidity risk

# economic operation


- obligation to make a future repurchase of collateral for original value means the transfer of title to the buyer is only temporary
- this creates loan of cash against loan of collateral
- repo functions like **secured loan/deposit**
  - capital at start = capital at end
  - return is for use of cash, not coupon or dividend for holding asset --- analogous to interest income & is commonly called 'repo interest' (but is legally the difference between two bond prices)
  - common to talk about 'borrowing' & 'lending' cash & collateral in a repo, even though it is buying & selling

# economic operation

- obligation to make a future repurchase of collateral for original value also means **risk** on collateral impacts seller, not buyer
  - **market risk** --- if collateral value falls (rises), seller has to repurchase at original value & suffers loss (profit)
  - **credit risk** --- if issuer of collateral defaults, seller has to repurchase at higher pre-default price
- repurchase is forward transaction in which seller hedges buyer against risk on collateral
- but seller will not take risk on collateral unless he receives **return** on collateral
  - **capital gain/loss** from changes in clean price
  - **income accrued** during repo
  - **income paid** during repo

# economic operation


income paid on **repurchase transaction**



Note: repo return (ie return on cash) is not shown.

# economic operation


income paid on **repurchase transaction** --- buyer compensates seller by means of same-day payment



Note: repo return (ie return on cash) is not shown.

# economic operation

income paid on **sell/buy-back** --- deferred compensation instead of income payment



Note: repo return (ie return on cash) is not shown.



# economic operation

## summary

- **purchase** transfers legal title to buyer in order to:
  - reduce his **legal risk** --- reduce credit risk
  - allow re-use of collateral --- reduce liquidity risk
  - reduced risk is rewarded with **more lending** at **lower rates**
- **repurchase** shifts **risk/return** back to seller in order to:
  - allows seller to borrow cash & give security as collateral but keep risk/return on security --- seller can use repo purely for financing securities
  - allows buyer to lend cash & take securities as collateral but without taking risk/return on security --- buyer can use repo purely for cash investment
- by end of repo, seller gets back any return on collateral (capital gains, income accrued or paid during repo)
- it is as though collateral had never been repoed out
- repo should not change investment risk of seller or expose buyer to investment risk on collateral


# legal structure & economic operation

## do you really understand repo?

- what happens if income is not paid on collateral?
- how to account for repo?


# legal structure & economic operation

**question:** if income is not paid on collateral, does buyer pay compensatory payment?



# legal structure & economic operation

**answer:** no, the seller retains the risk on the collateral  
& only passes through what he receives



# legal structure & economic operation

question: how to account for repo?

before repo

seller

assets		liabilities	
bonds	100	capital	10
		debt	90
	100		100

buyer

assets		liabilities	
cash	100	capital	10
		debt	90
	100		100

repo of 10 of bonds





# things like repo

## repo has legal & economic analogues

- repo is analogous to **FX swap**
- legally both involve immediate sale & future repurchase
- economically both create exchange of loans
- however, FX swap exchanges two cash amounts, so is off-balance sheet & accounted for like derivative



# things like repo

## US repo is different

- title transfer subject to recharacterisation risk in US (US courts look to substance)
- pledging in US easy
- so repo collateral is pledged, not sold
- but problems with pledging are resolved by:
  - exemption of repo pledges from basic rules of Bankruptcy Code ('safe harbors')
  - giving buyer a contractual general right of use
- result is different legal form, but same economic effect as title transfer repo
- US market talks about 'pledging' & 'rehypothecation' but we should not!


# core uses

- why do firms do repo?
- why do firms do reverse repo?


# core uses

- sellers can use repo to borrow cash to **finance long positions** & buyers can use reverse repo to lend cash --- **cash-driven repo**
- buyers can use reverse repo to borrow securities to **cover short positions** & sellers can use repo to lend securities --- **securities-driven repo**


# core use --- funding long position




# core use --- funding long position



# core use --- funding long position



# core use --- funding long position



# core use --- funding long position

date	action	BTAN delivery	cash payment
Tuesday 2 June	buy 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in <b>cash market</b> from Citi for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,550,000 (dirty price 105.50)		



# core use --- funding long position

date	action	BTAN delivery	cash payment
Tuesday 2 June	buy 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in <b>cash market</b> from Citi for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,550,000 (dirty price 105.50)		
Wednesday 3 June	agree 1-week <b>repo</b> of 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN to JP Morgan at a repo rate of 0.10% for delivery on T+1 (Thursday) for EUR 10,550,000 (have assumed that bond price has not changed)		

# core use --- funding long position

date	action	BTAN delivery	cash payment
Tuesday 2 June	buy 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in <b>cash market</b> from Citi for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,550,000 (dirty price 105.50)		
Wednesday 3 June	agree 1-week <b>repo</b> of 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN to JP Morgan at a repo rate of 0.10% for delivery on T+1 (Thursday) for EUR 10,550,000 (have assumed that bond price has not changed)		
Thursday 4 June	receive 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN from Citi and pay 10,550,000	+10,000,000 nominal from Citi	-10,550,000 to Citi
	deliver 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN to JP Morgan and receive 10,550,000	-10,000,000 nominal to JP Morgan	+10,550,000 from JP Morgan

# core use --- funding long position

date	action	BTAN delivery	cash payment
Tuesday 2 June	buy 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in <b>cash market</b> from Citi for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,550,000 (dirty price 105.50)		
Wednesday 3 June	agree 1-week <b>repo</b> of 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN to JP Morgan at a repo rate of 0.10% for delivery on T+1 (Thursday) for EUR 10,550,000 (have assumed that bond price has not changed)		
Thursday 4 June	receive 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN from Citi and pay 10,550,000	+10,000,000 nominal from Citi	-10,550,000 to Citi
	deliver 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN to JP Morgan and receive 10,550,000	-10,000,000 nominal to JP Morgan	+10,550,000 from JP Morgan
Tuesday 9 June	sell 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in <b>cash market</b> to SocGen for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,100,000 (dirty price 101.00)		

# core use --- funding long position


date	action	BTAN delivery	cash payment
Tuesday 2 June	buy 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in <b>cash market</b> from Citi for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,550,000 (dirty price 105.50)		
Wednesday 3 June	agree 1-week <b>repo</b> of 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN to JP Morgan at a repo rate of 0.10% for delivery on T+1 (Thursday) for EUR 10,550,000 (have assumed that bond price has not changed)		
Thursday 4 June	receive 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN from Citi and pay 10,550,000	+10,000,000 nominal from Citi	-10,550,000 to Citi
	deliver 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN to JP Morgan and receive 10,550,000	-10,000,000 nominal to JP Morgan	+10,550,000 from JP Morgan
Tuesday 9 June	sell 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in <b>cash market</b> to SocGen for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,100,000 (dirty price 101.00)		
Thursday 11 June	deliver 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN to SocGen and receive 10,100,000	-10,000,000 nominal to SocGen	+10,100,000 from SocGen
	unwind repo by repurchasing 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN from JP Morgan and paying 10,550,205 [= 10,550,000 * (1 + ((0.10 * 7)/(100 * 360)))]	+10,000,000 nominal from JP Morgan	-10,550,205 to JP Morgan

# core uses


## why repo?

- seller
  - liquidity management (borrowing)
  - funding trading inventory (especially for market-makers)
  - funding long risk positions
  - funding long hedges of short cash or derivative positions
  - funding long positions to arbitrage against short cash or derivatives positions
- buyer
  - liquidity management (lending) & reducing risk
- seller or buyer
  - credit intermediation (matched-book trading)


# core use --- covering short position



# core use --- covering short position




# core use --- covering short position





# core use --- covering short position



# core use --- covering short position

date	action	BTAN delivery	cash payment
Tuesday 2 June	sell 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in cash market to Citi for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,550,000 (dirty price 105.50)		

# core use --- covering short position

date	action	BTAN delivery	cash payment
Tuesday 2 June	sell 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in cash market to Citi for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,550,000 (dirty price 105.50)		
Wednesday 3 June	agree 1-week reverse repo of 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN from JP Morgan at a repo rate of 0.10% for delivery on T+1 (Thursday) for EUR 10,550,000 (have assumed that bond price has not changed)		

# core use --- covering short position

date	action	BTAN delivery	cash payment
Tuesday 2 June	sell 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in cash market to Citi for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,550,000 (dirty price 105.50)		
Wednesday 3 June	agree 1-week reverse repo of 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN from JP Morgan at a repo rate of 0.10% for delivery on T+1 (Thursday) for EUR 10,550,000 (have assumed that bond price has not changed)		
Thursday 4 June	deliver 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN to Citi and receive 10,550,000	-10,000,000 nominal to Citi	+10,550,000 from Citi
	receive 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN from JP Morgan and receive 10,550,000	+10,000,000 nominal from JP Morgan	-10,550,000 to JP Morgan

# core use --- covering short position

date	action	BTAN delivery	cash payment
Tuesday 2 June	sell 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in <b>cash market</b> to Citi for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,550,000 (dirty price 105.50)		
Wednesday 3 June	agree 1-week <b>reverse repo</b> of 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN from JP Morgan at a repo rate of 0.10% for delivery on T+1 (Thursday) for EUR 10,550,000 (have assumed that bond price has not changed)		
Thursday 4 June	deliver 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN to Citi and receive 10,550,000	-10,000,000 nominal to Citi	+10,550,000 from Citi
	receive 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN from JP Morgan and receive 10,550,000	+10,000,000 nominal from JP Morgan	-10,550,000 to JP Morgan
Tuesday 9 June	buy 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in <b>cash market</b> from SocGen for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,100,000 (dirty price 101.00)		

# core use --- covering short position

date	action	BTAN delivery	cash payment
Tuesday 2 June	sell 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in <b>cash market</b> to Citi for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,550,000 (dirty price 105.50)		
Wednesday 3 June	agree 1-week <b>reverse repo</b> of 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN from JP Morgan at a repo rate of 0.10% for delivery on T+1 (Thursday) for EUR 10,550,000 (have assumed that bond price has not changed)		
Thursday 4 June	deliver 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN to Citi and receive 10,550,000	-10,000,000 nominal to Citi	+10,550,000 from Citi
	receive 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN from JP Morgan and receive 10,550,000	+10,000,000 nominal from JP Morgan	-10,550,000 to JP Morgan
Tuesday 9 June	buy 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN in <b>cash market</b> from SocGen for delivery on T+2 (Thursday) for 10,100,000 (dirty price 101.00)		
Thursday 11 June	receive 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN from SocGen and pay 10,100,000	+10,000,000 nominal from SocGen	-10,100,000 to SocGen
	unwind reverse repo by delivering 10 million nominal of 5Y BTAN to JP Morgan and receive 10,550,205 [= 10,550,000 * (1 + ((0.10 * 7)/(100 * 360)))]	-10,000,000 nominal to JP Morgan	+10,550,205 from JP Morgan


# core uses

## why reverse repo?

- buyer
  - avoiding fails
  - hedging transitory short positions (market-makers)
  - covering short risk positions
  - covering short hedges of long cash or derivatives positions (including market-makers)
  - covering short positions to hedge new issues
  - covering short positions to arbitrage against long cash or derivatives positions
- seller
  - yield enhancement (lending specials for cheap cash)
- buyer or seller
  - trading specials
  - collateral transformation (swapping collateral)

# core uses

collateral/liquidity swaps are often executed as back-to-back repo & reverse repo





# credit risk

- probable loss on repo =  
 $\text{Probability of Default (PD)} \times \text{Loss Given Default (LGD)}$
  - collateral reduces LGD
  - PD on repo is joint probability of default by repo counterparty & collateral issuer
    - if repo counterparty defaults, liquidate collateral
    - if collateral issuer defaults, resort to repo counterparty
    - what if repo counterparty & collateral issuer default simultaneously?
- } double indemnity
- } wrong-way risk

# credit risk

## joint Probability of Default

assume cumulative default probabilities:

- PD of AA counterparty, AA collateral = 0.0075%

# credit risk

## joint Probability of Default

assume cumulative default probabilities:

- PD of AA counterparty, AA collateral = 0.0075%
- counterparty/collateral correlation = 0
- joint probability of default?

# credit risk

## joint Probability of Default

assume cumulative default probabilities:

- PD of AA counterparty, AA collateral = 0.0075%
- counterparty/collateral correlation = 0
- joint probability of default  
=  $0.0075\% \times 0.0075\% = 0.000000563\%$

# credit risk

## joint Probability of Default

assume cumulative default probabilities:

- PD of AA counterparty, AA collateral = 0.0075%
- counterparty/collateral correlation = 1
- joint probability of default?

# credit risk

## joint Probability of Default

assume cumulative default probabilities:


- PD of AA counterparty, AA collateral = 0.0075%
- counterparty/collateral correlation = 1
- joint probability of default = 0.0075%

# credit risk

## Probability of Default


correlation between  
credit risk of seller  
and collateral issuer

combined  
credit risk  
on reverse repo



# credit risk

- risk-free collateral is sometimes seen as complete substitute for counterparty credit risk





# credit risk on repo

- hedging reduces but cannot eliminate risk
- hedging changes the character of risk
- hedging with collateral transforms credit risk into operational risk & legal risk


# operational risks

- eligibility of collateral
- sufficiency of collateral
- secure custody of collateral
- disposal of collateral
- tax treatment

# legal risks

- recharacterisation risk
- capacity and authority
- set-off in insolvency
- other insolvency issues
- governing law/conflict of laws

# risk on repo



# risk on repo

## HEALTH WARNING

- collateral has legal & operational risks
- collateral may generate unexpected losses
- collateral should be secondary defence (insurance)
- primary defence is counterparty creditworthiness
- repo is no substitute for credit risk management
- repo is not an excuse for accepting lower credits
- only do repo with counterparties with whom you would do unsecured business

# risk on repo

## business case for repo

- more business  
same counterparties  
same capital  
higher return on capital

# risk on repo

## business case for repo

- more business  
same counterparties  
same capital  
higher return on capital
- same business  
same counterparties  
less capital  
higher return on capital


# liquidity risk on repo

## reverse repo

- collateral can be re-sold to get cash
- no/low liquidity risk --- depends on quality of collateral



# risk on repo



# **Professional Repo & Collateral Management Course**

*The repo instrument: legal, economic, operational character*

**Richard Comotto**  
**ICMA Centre**  
**University of Reading**  
**United Kingdom**

# Coffee break

**Types of repo: repurchase transactions v sell/buy-backs;  
floating-rate, open, evergreen, forward, term & synthetic repo;  
GC v specials; repo v securities lending**  
Richard Comotto, ICMA Centre at Reading University

# **Professional Repo & Collateral Management Course**

*types of repo*

**Richard Comotto**  
**ICMA Centre**  
**University of Reading**  
**United Kingdom**

# structures and market segments

- repurchase transaction v sell/buy-back
- types of repurchase transaction
- synthetic repo
- GC v specials
- repo v securities lending

# **Professional Repo & Collateral Management Course**

*repurchase transaction v sell/buy-back*

**Richard Comotto**  
**ICMA Centre**  
**University of Reading**  
**United Kingdom**

# repurchase transaction v sell/buy-back

- **repurchase transaction**
  - also known as classic repo
  - pension livrée in France
- **sell/buy-back**
  - also known as buy/sell-back or just sell/buys
  - gensaki in Japan, simultanea in Spain, PCT in Italy



# repurchase transaction v sell/buy-back

there are in fact, three types of repo

- **repurchase transactions**
- **undocumented sell/buy-backs** (no written contract)
  - economically but not legally repo
  - economically and legally repo (eg former Italy & Spain)
- **documented sell/buy-backs**

# repurchase transaction

<b>term</b>	1 week
<b>collateral</b>	3.5% GOV 10/10/26
<b>nominal value</b>	10,000,000
<b>clean price</b>	101.50
<b>accrued interest</b>	8 days
<b>repo rate</b>	2.10% (A/360)

# repurchase transaction

term	1 week
collateral	3.5% GOV 10/10/26
nominal value	10,000,000
clean price	101.50
accrued interest	8 days
repo rate	2.10% (A/360)
market value	10,157,671.23
purchase price	10,157,671.23
repo interest	4,147.72
repurchase price	10,161,818.95

no haircut/initial margin

# repurchase transaction

nominal value x clean price = clean value

$$10,000,000 \times \frac{101.50}{100} = 10,150,000.00$$

nominal value x coupon = accrued interest

$$10,000,000 \times \frac{3.5 \times 8}{100 \times 365} = 7,671.23$$

clean value + accrued interest = market value

$$10,150,000.00 + 7,671.23 = 10,157,671.23$$

NB coupon calculation uses bond market basis

# repurchase transaction

clean price + accrued interest = dirty price

$$101.50 + \frac{3.5 \times 8}{365} = 101.5767123$$

nominal value x dirty price = market value

$$10,000,000 \times \frac{101.5767123}{100} = 10,157,671.23$$

# repurchase transaction

repo interest


- assuming no initial margin or haircut

$$\overset{\text{purchase price}}{10,157,671.23} \frac{\overset{\text{repo interest}}{2.10 \times 7}}{100 \times 360} = \overset{\text{repo interest}}{4,147.72}$$

$$\overset{\text{purchase price}}{10,157,671.23} + \overset{\text{repo interest}}{4,147.72} = \overset{\text{repurchase price}}{10,161,818.95}$$

NB repo return calculation uses money market basis

# repurchase transaction



# repurchase transaction

GRAB

Corp RRRA

Enter <1><GO> to send screen via <MESSAGE> System.

## REPO/REVERSE REPO ANALYSIS

BUNDESOBL-143

OBL 3 1/2 08 #143

101.4900/101.5400

(3.10/3.09) BGN

@11:50

CUSIP: ED1687745

SETTLEMENT DATE	10/18/04	RATE (360)	2.1000%
<SETTLEMENT PRICE>	<MARKET PRICE>	COLLATERAL:	100.0000% OF MONEY
PRICE	101.5000000	Y/N, HOLD COLLATERAL PERCENT CONSTANT?	Y
YIELD	3.0931565	Y/N, BUMP ALL DATES FOR WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS?	Y
ACCRUED	0.0767123		
FOR 8 DAYS.		ROUNDING 1	1 = NOT ROUNDED
TOTAL	101.5767123	2	2 = ROUND TO NEAREST 1/8

FACE AMT M

10000

<OR>

SETTLEMENT MONEY

10157671.23

<OR> To solve for PRICE: Enter NUMBER of BONDS, SETTLEMENT MONEY & COLLATERAL

TERMINATION DATE

10/25/04

<OR>

TERM (IN DAYS)

?

ACCRUED 0.143836 FOR 15 DAYS.

### MONEY AT TERMINATION

WIRED AMOUNT	10,157,671.23
REPO INTEREST	4,147.72
TERMINATION MONEY	10,161,818.95

NOTES:

Australia 61 2 9777 8600

Brazil 5511 3048 4500

Europe 44 20 7330 7500

Germany 49 69 920410

Hong Kong 852 2977 6000

Japan 81 3 3201 8900

Singapore 65 6212 1000

U.S. 1 212 318 2000

Copyright 2004 Bloomberg L.P.

6675-899-3 28-Sep-04 11:53:31



# sell/buy-back

<b>term</b>	1 week
<b>forward price</b>	101.47435387
<b>collateral</b>	3.5% GOV 10/10/26
<b>nominal value</b>	10,000,000
<b>clean price</b>	101.50
<b>accrued interest</b>	8 days

# sell/buy-back

term	1 week
forward price	101.47435387
collateral	3.5% OBL-1XX 10/10/XX
nominal value	EUR 10,000,000
clean price	101.50
accrued interest	8 days

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{clean value} \\
 10,000,000 \left( \frac{101.50}{100} \right) - \overbrace{10,000,000 \left( \frac{3.5 \times 7}{100 \times 365} \right)}^{\text{accrued interest} = 6,712} - \overbrace{10,157,671 \left( \frac{2.1 \times 7}{100 \times 360} \right)}^{\text{repo interest} = 4,148} = \text{forward price} \\
 \hline
 10,000,000 \\
 \text{nominal value}
 \end{array}$$

# sell/buy-back

term	1 week
forward price	101.47435387
collateral	3.5% GOV 10/10/26
nominal value	10,000,000
clean price	101.50
accrued interest	8 days
market value	10,157,671.23
purchase price	10,157,671.23
repurchase price	10,161,818.95

no haircut/initial margin


# sell/buy-back

repurchase price - purchase price = repo interest

$$10,161,818.95 - 10,157,671.23 = \text{EUR}4,147.72$$

$$\left( \frac{\text{repo interest}}{\text{repurchase price}} \right) \frac{100 \times 360}{7} = \text{repo rate} = 2.10\%$$

# sell/buy-back



# sell/buy-back

GRAB Corp BSR

Enter <1><GO> to send screen via <MESSAGE> System.

## BUY/SELL BACK REPO ANALYSIS

BB Number: ED1687745 Page 1 of 2

BUNDESBL-143 OBL 3 1/2 08 #143 101.4900/101.5400 (3.10/3.09) BGN @11:50

SETTLEMENT 10/18/04

PRICE 101.50000000 <ACCRD: 0.07671233>

REPO % (ACT/360) 2.1000 <ACCRD # DAYS: 8>

FACE AMT M 10000

Minimum Piece: 100 / Minimum Increment: 1

TERMINATION 10/25/04

FORWARD PRICE 101.47435387 <ACCRD: 0.14383562>

FORWARD POINTS 0.025646 <ACCRD # DAYS: 15>

YIELD 3.093157%

WORKOUT DATE / PRICE

W Worst 10/10/08 100

TERM (actual # days): 7

YIELD 3.097979%

WORKOUT DATE / PRICE

W Worst 10/10/08 100

COLLATERAL 100.00% OF MONEY

ADD COUPONS TO FORWARD PRICE Y-N N

REINVESTMENT OF COUPONS

DATE	AMOUNT	RATE	%
/ /			%
/ /			%
/ /			%

COMPOUNDING METHOD: BX

P = Proceeds or B = Bullet

\* MONEY AT TERMINATION \*

SETTLEMENT AMOUNT	10,157,671.23
REPO INTEREST	4,147.72
TERMINATION MONEY	10,161,818.95

HOLD BOND PRICE/FACE AMOUNT PX

NOTES :

Australia 61 2 9777 8600 Brazil 5511 3048 4500 Europe 44 20 7330 7500 Germany 49 69 920410  
 Hong Kong 852 2977 6000 Japan 81 3 3201 8900 Singapore 65 6212 1000 U.S. 1 212 318 2000 Copyright 2004 Bloomberg L.P.  
 6675-899-3 28-Sep-04 11:54:29

NB These fields are parameters for the reinvestment of coupons

# repurchase transaction v sell/buy-back

	repurchase transaction	sell/buy-back	
		undocumented	documented
collateral conveyance	title transfer	title transfer	
economic effect	secured loan	secured loan	
written contract	yes	no	
contract	one	two	
margin maintenance	variation margining or early termination	none	
coupon	compensatory payment	coupon deducted from repurchase price	
substitution	by replacement	no	
variants	by agreement	no	
cost	legal & operational	small	

# sell/buy-back

- recognition of collateral in regulatory capital adequacy calculations requires:
  - documentation of rights of close-out & set-off
  - margin maintenance procedure



# sell/buy-back

- recognition of collateral in regulatory capital adequacy calculations requires:
  - documentation of rights of close-out & set-off
  - margin maintenance procedure
- some countries & some types of firm would have problems adopting repurchase transactions:
  - **legal problems** --- especially variation margin, coupon & substitution, which can make repos look like secured loans
  - **operational challenge** --- traditional back-office systems cannot manage variation margining

# sell/buy-back

- recognition of collateral in regulatory capital adequacy calculations requires:
  - documentation of rights of close-out & set-off
  - margin maintenance procedure
- some countries & some types of firm would have problems adopting repurchase transactions:
  - legal problems --- especially variation margin, coupon & substitution, which can make repos look like secured loans
  - operational challenge --- traditional back-office systems cannot manage variation margining
- **solution**
  - incorporation of sell/buy-backs into documentation (eg GMRA Buy/Sell-Back Annex)
  - introduces or triggers special operational features to avoid legal & operational problems of repurchase transactions

# sell/buy-back

how do special operational features overcome legal problems of:

- variation margin
- compensatory payments
- substitution

# sell/buy-back

1. to overcome legal problems of **variation margin**
  - instead of variation margin

purchase  
date

repurchase  
date



# sell/buy-back

1. to overcome legal problems of **variation margin**
  - instead of variation margin --- use **early termination**



# sell/buy-back

1. to overcome legal problems of variation margin
  - instead of variation margin --- use early termination & replacement



# sell/buy-back

two approaches to early termination & replacement:

- **Adjustment** --- change collateral
- **Repricing** --- change cash

# sell/buy-back

## early termination & replacement -- adjusting collateral

	buyer		seller	
purchase date	collateral	+10	collateral	-10
	cash	-10	cash	+10

original transaction

option 1: not cleaning up accrued repo interest



# sell/buy-back

## early termination & replacement -- adjusting collateral

	buyer		seller	
purchase date	collateral	+10	collateral	-10
	cash	-10	cash	+10
termination	collateral	-9	collateral	+9
	cash	+10.1	cash	-10.1

} original transaction

option 1: not cleaning up accrued repo interest

# sell/buy-back

## early termination & replacement -- adjusting collateral

	buyer		seller	
purchase date	collateral	+10	collateral	-10
	cash	-10	cash	+10
termination	collateral	-9	collateral	+9
	cash	+10.1	cash	-10.1
replacement	collateral	+10.1	collateral	-10.1
	cash	-10.1	cash	+10.1

} original transaction

option 1: not cleaning up accrued repo interest

# sell/buy-back

## early termination & replacement -- adjusting collateral

	buyer		seller	
purchase date	collateral	+10	collateral	-10
	cash	-10	cash	+10
termination	collateral	-9	collateral	+9
	cash	+10.1	cash	-10.1
replacement	collateral	+10.1	collateral	-10.1
	cash	-10.1	cash	+10.1
operational flows	collateral	+1.1	collateral	-1.1

} original transaction

option 1: not cleaning up accrued repo interest

# sell/buy-back

## early termination & replacement -- adjusting collateral

	buyer		seller		
purchase date	collateral	+10	collateral	-10	original transaction
	cash	-10	cash	+10	
termination	collateral	-9	collateral	+9	legal position = no margin
	cash	+10.1	cash	-10.1	
replacement	collateral	+10.1	collateral	-10.1	
	cash	-10.1	cash	+10.1	
operational flows	collateral	+1.1	collateral	-1.1	operational position ≡ margin

option 1: not cleaning up accrued repo interest

# sell/buy-back

## early termination & replacement -- adjusting collateral

	buyer		seller		
purchase date	collateral	+10	collateral	-10	original transaction
	cash	-10	cash	+10	
termination	collateral	-9	collateral	+9	legal position = no margin
	cash	+10.1	cash	-10.1	
replacement	collateral	+10	collateral	-10	operational position ≡ margin
	cash	-10	cash	+10	
operational flows	collateral	+1	collateral	-1	
	cash	+0.1	cash	-0.1	

option 2: clearing up accrued repo interest

# sell/buy-back


## early termination & replacement – repricing collateral

	buyer		seller		
purchase date	collateral	+10	collateral	-10	original transaction
	cash	-10	cash	+10	
termination	collateral	-9	collateral	+9	legal position = no margin
	cash	+10.1	cash	-10.1	
replacement	collateral	+9	collateral	-9	operational position ≡ margin
	cash	-9	cash	+9	
operational flows	cash	+1.1	cash	-1.1	

# sell/buy-back

to overcome legal problems of **compensatory payment**:

- instead of **compensatory payment** --- deduction from repurchase price



Note: repo interest is not shown.

# sell/buy-back

3. to overcome legal problems of **substitution**:

- instead of **substitution** --- early termination & replacement, with collateral being substituted through the replacement transaction



# sell/buy-back

how does early termination & replacement overcome operational challenge of variation margin?

# sell/buy-back

## early termination & replacement


sell ticket  
purchase  
date

buy ticket  
repurchase  
date




# sell/buy-back

## early termination & replacement



# sell/buy-back

## early termination & replacement



# sell/buy-back

## summary

- special operational features in Buy/Sell-Back Annex overcome legal problems with repurchase transactions because:
  - **variation margin** is legally substituted by buy/sell technique with same effect
  - **compensatory payments** are legally substituted by deductions from the repurchase price
  - **substitution** is legally achieved using buy/sell technique
- early termination & replacement also overcomes operational challenge of variation margin by:
  - using buy/sell technique

# repurchase transaction v sell/buy-back

	repurchase transaction	sell/buy-back	
		undocumented	documented
collateral conveyance	title transfer	title transfer	title transfer
economic effect	secured loan	secured loan	secured loan
written contract	yes	no	yes
contract	one	two	one
margin maintenance	variation margining or by early termination	none	by early termination
coupon	compensatory payment	coupon deducted from repurchase price	coupon deducted from repurchase price
substitution	by replacement	no	by early termination
variants	by agreement	no	not in practice
cost	legal & operational	small	legal & operational

# **Professional Repo & Collateral Management Course**

*types of repurchase transaction*

**Richard Comotto**  
**ICMA Centre**  
**University of Reading**  
**United Kingdom**

# types of repurchase transaction

- fixed-rate repo
- floating-rate repo
- open repo
- forward repo



# types of repurchase transaction

## **fixed-rate repo**

- fixed repurchase date
- fixed repo rate
- return due at repurchase date

# types of repurchase transaction

## floating-rate repo

- fixed repurchase date
- repo rate linked to index, regularly updated
- return due at repurchase date
- passive interest rate risk management solution (alternative of overnight repo is operationally intensive)
- EONIA-linked repo:
  - do not compound but average
  - may use penultimate fixing for last 2 days
- term rate-linked repo (eg 1-month IBOR): when to pay return?
- term repo (over one year) are usually floating-rate

# types of repurchase transaction


## **open repo** (on demand, terminable on demand)

- provision ready for use in GMRA 3(d)-(e)
- no initial repurchase date: option of buyer or seller
- repo rate reset by agreement
- interest not compounded
- return due at later of repurchase date, month end
- avoids roll-over execution & settlement costs

# types of repurchase transaction

## forward repo


- described in GMRA Annex I, 2(b)
- later than conventional purchase date (T+2)
- default is T+3, but can be set later



# types of repurchase transaction


## forward repo

- provision to agree only class/type of collateral at T & defer ISIN selection until PD-2
- remember to confirm this selection




# types of repurchase transaction


## evergreen repo



## extendible repo (eg 3-2-3 = 3 to original RD; 2 remaining term before option; 3 extension)



## puttable repo




# **Professional Repo & Collateral Management Course**

*synthetic repo*

**Richard Comotto**  
**ICMA Centre**  
**University of Reading**  
**United Kingdom**

# synthetic repo


question: who has ownership; who has risk/return?





# synthetic repo

question: who has ownership; who has risk/return?



**outright/cash transaction**

# synthetic repo

question: who has ownership, who has risk/return?



## total return swap

- TRS pays total return = change in total value of reference asset
- over contract period
- if total return is positive, red pays blue
- if total return is negative, blue pays red

# synthetic repo

question: who has ownership; who has risk/return?



## total return swap

- TRS pays total return = change in total value of reference asset
- over contract period
- if total return is positive, red pays blue
- if total return is negative, blue pays red

# synthetic repo

question: who has ownership; who has risk/return?




## total return swap

- TRS pays total return = change in total value of reference asset
- over contract period
- if total return is positive, red pays blue
- if total return is negative, blue pays red


# synthetic repo

question: who has ownership; who has risk/return?



# synthetic repo

question: who has ownership; who has risk/return?



**synthetic repo**

# synthetic repo

- repurchase by gentleman's agreement
- TRS can be substituted by other derivatives, eg futures, delta-one exchange-traded options, OTC option combos
- more common in equity

# synthetic repo

## why do synthetics?

- cash costs LIBOR+ rather than repo rate
- extra cost should be offset by balance sheet neutrality = capital saving but not under IFRS
- avoids need to recognise any loss on legacy assets: accounted as 'failed sales'
- long-term trades, illiquid assets, leverage
- avoids poor infrastructure, operational cost, legal uncertainty, restrictions on repo
- only ISDA documentation needed
- preserves repo lines for liquidity management
- tax obstacles, tax arbitrage



# **Professional Repo & Collateral Management Course**


***GC v specials***

**Richard Comotto**  
**ICMA Centre**  
**University of Reading**  
**United Kingdom**


# GC

- GC = **general collateral**
- in bilateral transactions, GC is an unpublished variable list (basket) of security issues within each class of security, usually only government securities, of which each issue is equally acceptable as repo collateral --- at same repo rate = **GC repo rate**
- buyers should be indifferent between GC issues: GC issues should be substitutes
- basket emerges by tacit market consensus
- collateral is selected at **end** of negotiation
- **seller has some choice** about which issue to deliver
- driver is cash supply/demand --- GC repo is **cash-driven**
- GC repo is an alternative to unsecured lending of cash: another **money market** instrument: GC repo rate is therefore **correlated** with money market rates

## GC repo v interbank deposit rates



very short-term GC repo rate can exceed interbank deposit rate




# GC

GC is a term also used by automatic trading systems (ATS) & central counterparties (CCP) to describe standard baskets of security issues that are all given equal status in the collateral allocation process

# specials

- **special** = single security issue trading in repo market **below GC repo rate**
- specials created by **strong demand/scarc supply** of specific security issue --- **security-driven repo**
- specials buyer has to offer **cheap cash** to seller: special rates can be negative
- premium to GC rate = securities lending fee
- each special has **unique repo rate**
- collateral is selected at the **start** of negotiation
- special repo is alternative to **securities lending**: special repo is a **capital market** instrument

# specials



} GC-specials spread

# specials

- special is a term also used by automatic trading systems (ATS) & central counterparties (CCP) to describe specific (non-GC) collateral




# specials

## what makes collateral go on special?

- excess demand
  - when bond becomes cheapest-to-deliver for futures and options
  - need for guaranteed delivery
  - when benchmark issues are borrowed to hedge auctions
  - short-selling
  - benchmarks --- most heavily traded
- scarce supply
  - small float due to gradually increasing purchases by buy-and-hold investors
  - safe haven hoarding by risk-averse investors
  - stripping coupons
  - market squeezes
  - distribution of supply
  - corporate actions
  - income payments & operational constraints on lenders
  - price-sensitive lenders

# specials




Average specialness spread on 10-year US Treasuries. (D'Amico et al 2013)

# GC v specials

	GC	specials
<b>price</b>	cash-driven	securities-driven
<b>collateral</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• any of a group of substitutable securities within same class</li> <li>• liquid</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• specific issue</li> <li>• very liquid</li> </ul>
<b>repo rate</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• highest repo rate</li> <li>• common rate</li> <li>• correlated with unsecured rates</li> <li>• spread below LIBOR = reduced LGD</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• below GC repo rate</li> <li>• unique rate</li> <li>• uncorrelated with other rates</li> <li>• spread below GC = securities borrowing fee</li> </ul>
<b>who selects collateral?</b>	seller or tri-party agent	buyer
<b>point of allocation</b>	end of negotiation	start of negotiation
<b>analogous to:</b>	money market instruments	securities borrowing & lending

# specials


dealer reverses in bond when GC...



**specials trading**

# specials


dealer reverses in bond when GC and repos it out when special



**specials trading**

# specials

Why not buy a special in the cash market & repo it out for cheap cash?



# specials

GC (ON)	5.00%
special (ON)	<u>0.85%</u>
specialness	4.15%

$$\text{value} = \text{EUR}100,000,000 \times \frac{4.15 \times 1}{100 \times 360} = \text{EUR}11,528$$

# specials

- specialness = liquidity premium
- expected income gain = capital loss
- expected return is unchanged




# **Professional Repo & Collateral Management Course**

*repo v securities lending*

**Richard Comotto**  
**ICMA Centre**  
**University of Reading**  
**United Kingdom**


# repo v securities lending

dealer borrows bond A through  
securities borrowing transaction against bond Z




# repo v securities lending

dealer borrows bond A through  
reverse repo financed by repo of bond Z



# repo v securities lending

dealer borrows bond A through  
reverse repo financed by repo of bond Z



$\text{GC rate} - \text{specials rate} = \text{specialness spread} = \text{securities lending fee}$


# securities lending v repo

- securities lending is not always of specials or even securities-driven (except for securities borrower)
- repo is not always of GC or even cash-driven


buying GC = cash-driven  
buying specials = securities-driven

selling GC = cash-driven  
selling specials = securities-driven

repo



securities lending



borrowing GC = securities-driven  
borrowing specials = securities-driven

lending GC = cash or securities-driven  
lending specials = securities-driven

# securities lending v repo

- operational differences
- legal differences
- market differences

# securities lending v repo

## operational differences

repo	securities lending
securities v cash	securities v securities/cash
direct interest (repo rate)	indirect interest (reinvestment rate)
gross interest on cash	net interest (fee + rebate)
interest at maturity	fees/interest monthly

# securities lending v repo

## legal differences

repo

---

title is sold

GMRA

securities lending

---

title is transferred/pledged

GMSLA, OSLA, GESLA



# securities lending v repo

## market differences

### repo

bond-driven  
finance-driven  
initial margin to cash-giver  
typically fixed term  
plain vanilla  
large average deal size  
  
investment banks  
two-way flows  
collateral re-use common  
limited role for agents  
collateral agreed deal by deal  
limited price tiering

### securities lending

equity-driven  
short-driven  
initial margin to cash-taker  
typically open  
customised  
small average deal size  
  
investors and custodians  
one-way flows  
collateral re-use rare  
major role for agents  
collateral managed as portfolio  
price sensitive to counterparty

# securities lending v repo

- **why use repo?**
  - you are cash-provider --- most initial margins/hairecuts in repo favour buyer
  - fixed terms more common
  - large deal size possible
  - greater legal certainty in some jurisdictions because repo is recognised
  - repo documentation may already be in place
- **why use securities lending?**
  - easier to borrow equity
  - securities lending documentation may already be in place
  - some investors do not want cash: management resources, balance sheet
  - may be legal/regulatory prohibitions on repo
  - perception of lower risk than repo, eg indemnification by agent lender, initial margin is standard, type of counterparties
  - easier to run short positions given typical lender is not dealer
  - hides securities borrowing from other dealers

# **Professional Repo & Collateral Management Course**

*types of repo*

**Richard Comotto**  
**ICMA Centre**  
**University of Reading**  
**United Kingdom**

# Lunch

## **The links between repos, bonds & derivatives**

Khagendra X Gupta, Executive Director, European Rates  
Derivatives Strategy, J.P. Morgan

## The links between repos, bonds & derivatives

**Khagendra Gupta<sup>AC</sup>**

(44-20) 7134-0486

Khagendra.x.gupta@jpmorgan.com

J.P. Morgan Securities plc

<sup>AC</sup> Indicates certifying analyst. See last page for analyst certification and important disclosures.

# Calculating the forward price of a bond using repo rates

Spot clean price (DBR 3.25% Dec 42): 147.272  
 Accrued Interest: 2.929  
 Dirty price :  
 $147.272 + 2.929 = 150.201$

Repo rate: -1.3%  
 1M (30 days) repo cost:  
 $150.021 * 1.3\% * 30/360 = -0.1627$

Forward price:  
 $150.201 + (-0.1627) = 150.0387$

DBR 3 1/4 07/04/42 Corp 90 Send To 97 Settings Buy/Sell Back Repo Analysis

Type S/B Trade Date 05/25/17 15:10 CUSIP EI3229347 ISIN DE0001135432

Repo Information

Settlement Date 05/29/17  
 Settlement Price 147.27200000 (AI 2.92945205) Yield 1.087578 % to Worst 07/04/42 @ 100  
 Repo Rate (ACT/360) -1.3000 % (AI 329 days)  
 Face Amount 1000M

Termination Date 06/28/17 Term (# Days) 30  
 Forward Price 146.84215847 (AI 3.19657534) Yield 1.098326 % to Worst 07/04/42 @ 100  
 Forward Points 0.429842 (AI 359 days)  
 Collateral Haircut 100.0000 %

Reinvestment of Coupons			Money at Termination	
Date	Amount	Rate	Settlement Money	
mm/dd/yy	-	%	1,502,014.52	
mm/dd/yy	-	%	Repo Interest	-1,627.18
mm/dd/yy	-	%	Termination Money	1,500,387.34

Add Coupon to Forward Price  
☒ Bump Coupon Dates for Weekends/Holidays  
 Compounding Method ☐ Bullet ☐ Proceeds Hold Bond ☒ Price ☐ Face Amount P/L


Notes

Australia 61 2 9777 8600 Brazil 5511 2395 9000 Europe 44 20 7330 7500 Germany 49 69 9204 1210 Hong Kong 852 2977 6000  
 Japan 81 3 3201 8900 Singapore 65 6212 1000 U.S. 1 212 318 2000 Copyright 2017 Bloomberg Finance L.P.  
 SN 465081 H476-4264-0 25-May-17 15:24:11 BST GMT+1:00

What other factor(s) could impact a bond's forward price?

# Central bank policies are the biggest drivers of repo rates


Repo rates have declined over the last few years as the ECB has taken policy rates into negative territory  
3M Generalized collateral repo rate for Germany, France, Italy, and ECB refi and deposit facility rates; since 1 Jan 2010; %





# ECB's balance sheet expansion and high excess liquidity has pushed Euro area repo rates even lower

Repo specialness has increased broadly in sync with excess liquidity in the Euro area  
Repo specialness\* regressed against Euro area excess liquidity; since 1 Jan 2014; bp



\* Repo specialness defined as: EONIA fixings – RFR index.  
Source for RFR Index: MTS and BrokerTec platforms

Benchmark bonds generally trade special to GC repo rate

Current 3M repo specialness of various benchmark bonds; bp

	3M GC; %	Actual repo rate; %	Repo specialness; bp
<b>Germany</b>			
2Y	-0.64	-0.85	21
5Y	-0.64	-0.64	0
10Y	-0.64	-1.15	51
30Y	-0.64	-1.15	51
<b>US</b>			
2Y	1.07	0.95	12
5Y	1.07	0.90	17
10Y	1.07	0.68	39
30Y	1.07	0.90	17

## Bank balance sheet pressure also impacts repo funding costs

The changes to the PSPP lending facilities announced by the ECB at the December meeting did not prevent the development of funding pressure around year end with German RFR repo index EONIA specialness moving over 450bp  
Statistics of German RFR repo index specialness to EONIA around month end, quarter end and year end; bp


	RFR Germany Spread over EONIA					
	Fixing (ex lbd of each	Month End	Month end value ex quarter	Quarter End	Quarter End (ex year end)	Year End
Average 2013	-8	-13	-11	-16	-14	-22
Std dev 2013	2	4	2	4	1	-
Average 2014	-6	-15	-10	-26	-30	-14
Std dev 2014	4	13	6	16	17	-
Average 2015	-12	-16	-10	-28	-16	-65
Std dev 2015	4	15	3	21	3	-
Average 2016	-25	-65	-25	-146	-43	-455
Std dev 2016	13	118	10	179	14	-
Avg 2013-2015	-9	-15	-10	-24	-20	-34
Std dev	4	12	4	16	12	22
Avg 2013-2016	-13	-27	-14	-54	-26	-139
Std dev	10	64	9	105	16	183

Source for RFR index: MT S and BrokerTec platforms

## Trading a bond – calculating carry

Buying a bond with a fixed coupon; how much do you actually earn in an unchanged yield scenario?

- Bond coupons
- However, using bond yield is a better approximation to account for pull-to-par feature



### What about funding the position?

If funded position, then funding cost (generally via repo markets) should be accounted for as well. Carry is an important consideration for investors in setting up trades.

Bond carry is defined as, Bond coupon – funding cost.

This carry calculation is under the assumption that bond prices remain unchanged which means that bond yields are different at inception and maturity.

Another definition of carry: bond yields remain unchanged; carry defined as Forward yield – spot yield (see later)

# Calculating the forward price of a bond - revisited

Spot clean price (DBR 3.25 Dec42): 147.272  
 Accrued Interest: 2.929  
 Dirty price :  
 $147.272 + 2.929 = 150.201$

Coupon accrued:  
 $3.25\% \times 30/365 = 0.267$

Repo rate:  
 $-1.3\%1M$  (30 days) repo cost:  
 $150.021 \times 1.3\% \times 30/360 = -0.1627$

Forward price:  
 $150.201 - 0.267 + (-0.1627) = 150.201 - (0.4298) = 149.7716$

DBR 3 1/4 07/04/42 Corp 90 Send To 97 Settings Buy/Sell Back Repo Analysis

Type S/B Trade Date 05/25/17 15:10 CUSIP EI3229347 ISIN DE0001135432

Repo Information

Settlement Date 05/29/17  
 Settlement Price 147.27200000 (AI 2.92945205) Yield 1.087578 % to Worst  
 Repo Rate (ACT/360) -1.3000 % (AI 329 days) 07/04/42 @ 100  
 Face Amount 1000M

Termination Date 06/28/17 Term (# Days) 30  
 Forward Price 146.84215847 (AI 3.19657534) Yield 1.098326 % to Worst  
 Forward Points 0.429842 (AI 359 days) 07/04/42 @ 100  
 Collateral Haircut 100.0000 %

Reinvestment of Coupons

Date	Amount	Rate
mm/dd/yy	-	%
mm/dd/yy	-	%
mm/dd/yy	-	%

Add Coupon to Forward Price  
 Bump Coupon Dates for Weekends/Holidays

Compounding Method Bullet Proceeds Hold Bond Price Face Amount 3 P/L

Notes


Money at Termination

Settlement Money	1,502,014.52
Repo Interest	-1,627.18
Termination Money	1,500,387.34

Australia 61 2 9777 8600 Brazil 5511 2395 9000 Europe 44 20 7330 7500 Germany 49 69 9204 1210 Hong Kong 852 2977 6000  
 Japan 81 3 3201 6900 Singapore 65 6212 1000 U.S. 1 212 316 2000 Copyright 2017 Bloomberg Finance L.P.  
 SN 465081 H476-4264-0 25-May-17 15:24:11 BST GMT+1:00


What if there is a coupon payment within the trade horizon?

## Funded positions – performance versus deposits



- Investor trades off yield pick-up/give-up against duration (risk)
- Positive curve implies bearish expectations
  - “earn time or carry” when long
- Negative curve implies bullish expectations
  - “costs time” when long

Consider 3 basic scenarios...



P&L approximation

$$\text{P\&L} \approx \text{Time} - \Delta \text{Yield} \times \text{Mod Dur}_{\text{Fwd}}$$

# 1. Yield unchanged: Time or carry




How much will I make if the yield is unchanged?

$$\text{Time} = (\text{Yield} - \text{Funding Rate}) \times \text{Holding period}$$

“Time” captures the cost or benefit of carry over the holding period

- Need to adjust yields and day-counts correctly



No change in yield

## 2. Breakeven: Forward yield




**How must the yield move to breakeven after funding?**

$$\text{P\&L} \approx \text{Time} - \Delta\text{Yield} \times \text{Mod Dur}_{\text{Fwd}}$$

$$\text{Time} \approx ( \text{Forward Yield} - \text{Initial Yield} ) \times \text{Mod Dur}_{\text{Fwd}}$$

$$\text{Forward Yield} \approx \frac{\text{Time}}{\text{Mod Dur}_{\text{Fwd}}} + \text{Initial Yield}$$



■ Forward yield expresses this “Time” in terms of bp


■ NB: Must consider price sensitivity at the horizon

Forward yield curve



### 3. Yield curve unchanged: Slide or roll

Example: Slide of 5-year bond over next 2 years



- As a position matures, it slides down the term structure
- Assumption: shape and level of the yield curve remain unchanged
  - in a positive curve will give a capital gain
  - this is not the “market expectation”

## Example

Calculate the 3-month Time, Forward yield and Slide yield on the position below:

	Yield (ann)	Mod Dur	3mo Repo(act/360)
5yr T-note	3.05%	4.2yr	1.13%
4yr T-note	2.89%		

(Assumptions: same rate convention, linearly interpolated slide, Mod Dur shortens by 0.2yrs)

**Time = ( Yield - Funding rate ) × Holding period**

$$= ( 3.05\% - 1.13\% ) \times 0.25 = 0.48\% = 48 \text{ ticks}$$


**Forward yield  $\approx$  Time + Initial yield  $\approx 0.48\% / 4 + 3.05\% = 3.17\%$**

**Slide = ( 3.05% - 2.89% ) × 0.25 = 0.04%**


---

**Mod Dur,Fwd**

# Analyzing a funded position



# Changing the funding rate makes a big difference




- “Expensive” bonds are often cheaper to fund
  - trade “special” on repo, not so expensive in forward space
- How fast will a bond have to cheapen to lose money?
  - implied breakeven may provide good protection

Implicit cost of funding is a key part of relative value analysis

# Is carry a good way to position in a stable rates environment?


- Yes, but...
- Carry does not take into account the volatility of yield curves
- Need a measure of carry per unit of risk



Carry adjusted for volatility of yields a good indicator of where to position in a stable rates environment

# Carry to Risk is just a snapshot; the dynamics will change over time


- Can compare carry-to-risk vs historical value
- Gives a measure of how much risk-adjusted-carry has changed over time



We must understand how the carry dynamics change

# Carry to Risk is just a snapshot; the dynamics will change over time

- Can compare carry-to-risk vs historical value
- Gives a measure of how much risk-adjusted-carry has changed over time



We must understand how the carry dynamics change

# Understanding bond futures

## Important concepts in bond futures

- **Conversion factor** (Forward price of the bond at delivery if yielding the notional coupon – generally 6%)
- **Invoice price** (Futures Settlement Price x Conversion Factor<sub>i</sub> + Accrued Interest<sub>i</sub>)
- **Implied repo rate** – Cost of funding as implied by the futures market

$$\text{IRR} = [\text{invoice price} / \text{purchase price} - 1] \times [360 / \text{days}] , \text{ or}$$

$$= [(\text{FutPrice} \times \text{Cfac} + \text{AI}_d) / (\text{BondPrice} + \text{AI}_0) - 1] \times [360 / \text{days}]$$

- **Futures net basis** – an indication of the difference between *implied* repo rate and *actual* repo rate




# Trading the futures basis: conceptual framework

(Gross) Basis = **bond (spot)** - **futures x factor**

Net Basis (BNOC) = **bond (fwd)** - **futures x factor**

so,

(Gross) Basis = **carry** + **net basis**



OABNOC = BNOC - Delivery option

OABNOC < 0


Futures is rich: market price of delivery option is cheap to fair value

OABNOC > 0

Futures is cheap: market price delivery option is rich to fair value


# Cash/futures price relationships

Futures price adjusted for conversion factor and cash prices (linearized)




\* Data is illustrative

# Basis of high duration bond is like a call option



\*  $Basis = Price - Factor \times Futures$

# Basis of low duration bond is like a put option




\*  $\text{Basis} = \text{Price} - \text{Factor} \times \text{Futures}$

# Trading futures basis as an arbitrage opportunity

CTD net basis of bond future will converge to zero at expiry

Dec16, Mar17, and Jun17 Buxl net basis; since 1 Oct 2016; cents



## Buying the basis involves:

- Buying the bond (CTD) in the repo market
- Selling futures against it

## At futures expiry,

- Deliver the bond

**Net basis is a measure of relative value and akin to arbitrage opportunity**


## What's the catch?

- Locking the repo rate till delivery that was used to calculate the net basis
- Term repo market is illiquid

# Trading futures roll to position for repo scarcity


In the Dec16/Mar17 roll, investors bought the calendar spread in anticipation of bond scarcity...

Dec16 Buxl actual and implied repo rate; 1 Oct 2016 – 10 Dec 2016; %



...which resulted in significant cheapening of the back contract

Mar17 Buxl actual and implied repo rate; 1 Oct 2016 – 1 Jan 2017; %



# Futures swap spread differential is also a reflection of repo

A part of the futures swap spread differential between the front and back bond futures CTD, especially in cases where the CTD is the same, can be explained by difference in term repo for the CTDs

## J.P.Morgan futures asset swap spread report


### Euro Futures Swap Spread Report

Buxl			Spot				Fwd at 12 Jun 17; Fut PVBP beta = 300.6 Futures price = 165.36; Invoice SS = 34.3								Fwd at 11 Sep 17; Fut PVBP beta = 299.4 Futures price = 163.68; Invoice SS = 32.6							
CTD Type	Mat	Cpn	Mid	Yield	SS	PVBP	Repo (Imp.)		Yld	SS	Fact.	Basis	BNoC	Repo (Imp.)		Yld	SS	Fact.	Basis	BNoC		
MU	DBR JUL39	4.25	163.84	1.012	43.0	2676	-0.47		1.017	42.9				-0.71		1.044	42.3					
	DBR JUL40	4.75	175.95	1.037	41.7	2917	-0.48		1.041	41.7				-0.65		1.068	41.1					
	DBR JUL42	3.25	146.12	1.130	34.3	2744	-1.30	-0.19	1.136	34.2	0.882632	16	-8	-1.30	-1.32	1.169	31.6	0.883261	154	1		
	DBR JUL44	2.50	129.90	1.201	28.5	2696	-1.30	-79.91	1.207	28.5	0.754721	510	490	-0.85	-14.00	1.231	26.7	0.755949	617	510		
	DBR AUG46	2.50	130.93	1.233	26.3	2877	-1.30	-123.14	1.238	26.3	0.744349	784	765	-0.85	-20.80	1.262	25.2	0.745560	890	782		

Bund			Spot				Fwd at 12 Jun 17; Fut PVBP beta = 134.0 Futures price = 160.80; Invoice SS = 46.7							Fwd at 11 Sep 17; Fut PVBP beta = 146.7 Futures price = 162.67; Invoice SS = 41.2						
CTD Type	Mat	Cpn	Mid	Yield	SS	PVBP	Repo (Imp.)	Yld	SS	Fact.	Basis	BNoC	Repo (Imp.)	Yld	SS	Fact.	Basis	BNoC		
M	DBR MAY24	1.50	110.74	-0.038	51.3	741	-0.73	-0.033	51.3				-0.68	-0.008	51.4					
	DBR AUG24	1.00	107.20	0.002	50.4	752	-0.79	0.008	50.3				-1.10	0.052	48.8					
	DBR FEB25	0.50	103.19	0.086	48.6	784	-0.73	0.091	48.6				-1.15	0.137	46.9					
	DBR AUG25	1.00	106.93	0.152	48.2	848	-0.76	0.157	48.1				-1.35	0.211	45.7					
	DBR FEB26	0.50	102.33	0.230	46.5	874	-1.18	-0.34	0.238	46.2	0.636105	4	-4	-1.65	0.299	43.1				
U	DBR AUG26	0.00	97.07	0.322	43.2	892	-1.30	-62.49	0.331	42.8	0.585882	286	281	-1.28	-1.29	0.376	41.2	0.594455	37	0
	DBR FEB27	0.25	98.54	0.403	40.8	944	-1.30	-89.42	0.411	40.5	0.586859	418	410	-1.20	-5.77	0.455	39.1	0.594839	178	135
	WI AUG27	0.00																		

Schatz swap spread have exhibited a strong relationship to repo specialness

Front Schatz OIS swap spreads regressed against a) adjusted\* RFR\*\* German repo specialness to EONIA; b) 10Y France/Germany benchmark spread; Mar16 – Mar17; bp





## Conclusion

Repo rates have a large role to play in the bond and fixed income derivatives market

- Calculating bond carry
- Futures basis trades
- Swap spreads

Buying/selling a bond in our trade recommendation is also dependent on the availability of the bond in the repo market. It is sometimes the case that shorting a bond via repo could be very punitive

# Disclosures

**Analyst Certification:** The research analyst(s) denoted by an “AC” on the cover of this report certifies (or, where multiple research analysts are primarily responsible for this report, the research analyst denoted by an “AC” on the cover or within the document individually certifies, with respect to each security or issuer that the research analyst covers in this research) that: (1) all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his or her personal views about any and all of the subject securities or issuers; and (2) no part of any of the research analyst's compensation was, is, or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed by the research analyst(s) in this report. For all Korea-based research analysts listed on the front cover, they also certify, as per KOFIA requirements, that their analysis was made in good faith and that the views reflect their own opinion, without undue influence or intervention.

**Company-Specific Disclosures:** Important disclosures, including price charts and credit opinion history tables, are available for compendium reports and all J.P. Morgan-covered companies by visiting <https://jpm.com/research/disclosures>, calling 1-800-477-0406, or e-mailing [research.disclosure.inquiries@jpmorgan.com](mailto:research.disclosure.inquiries@jpmorgan.com) with your request. J.P. Morgan's Strategy, Technical, and Quantitative Research teams may screen companies not covered by J.P. Morgan. For important disclosures for these companies, please call 1-800-477-0406 or e-mail [research.disclosure.inquiries@jpmorgan.com](mailto:research.disclosure.inquiries@jpmorgan.com).

**Analysts' Compensation:** The research analysts responsible for the preparation of this report receive compensation based upon various factors, including the quality and accuracy of research, client feedback, competitive factors, and overall firm revenues.

## Other Disclosures

J.P. Morgan (“JPM”) is the global brand name for J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (“JPMS”) and its affiliates worldwide. J.P. Morgan Cazenove is a marketing name for the U.K. investment banking businesses and EMEA cash equities and equity research businesses of JPMorgan Chase & Co. and its subsidiaries.

**Options related research:** If the information contained herein regards options related research, such information is available only to persons who have received the proper option risk disclosure documents. For a copy of the Option Clearing Corporation's Characteristics and Risks of Standardized Options, please contact your J.P. Morgan Representative or visit the OCC's website at <http://www.optionsclearing.com/publications/risks/riskstoc.pdf>

## Legal Entities Disclosures

**U.S.:** JPMS is a member of NYSE, FINRA, SIPC and the NFA. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is a member of FDIC. **U.K.:** JPMorgan Chase N.A., London Branch, is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and is subject to regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and to limited regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority. Details about the extent of our regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority are available from J.P. Morgan on request. J.P. Morgan Securities plc (JPMS plc) is a member of the London Stock Exchange and is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Registered in England & Wales No. 2711006. Registered Office 25 Bank Street, London, E14 5JP. **South Africa:** J.P. Morgan Equities South Africa Proprietary Limited is a member of the Johannesburg Securities Exchange and is regulated by the Financial Services Board. **Hong Kong:** J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited (CE number AAJ321) is regulated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong and/or J.P. Morgan Broking (Hong Kong) Limited (CE number AAB027) is regulated by the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong. **Korea:** This material is issued and distributed in Korea by or through J.P. Morgan Securities (Far East) Limited, Seoul Branch, which is a member of the Korea Exchange (KRX) and is regulated by the Financial Services Commission (FSC) and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). **Australia:** J.P. Morgan Australia Limited (JPMAL) (ABN 52 002 888 011/AFS Licence No: 238188) is regulated by ASIC and J.P. Morgan Securities Australia Limited (JPMSAL) (ABN 61 003 245 234/AFS Licence No: 238066) is regulated by ASIC and is a Market, Clearing and Settlement Participant of ASX Limited and CHI-X. **Taiwan:** J.P. Morgan Securities (Taiwan) Limited is a participant of the Taiwan Stock Exchange (company-type) and regulated by the Taiwan Securities and Futures Bureau. **India:** J.P. Morgan India Private Limited (Corporate Identity Number - U67120MH1992FTC068724), having its registered office at J.P. Morgan Tower, Off. C.S.T. Road, Kalina, Santacruz - East, Mumbai – 400098, is registered with Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) as a ‘Research Analyst’ having registration number INH000001873. J.P. Morgan India Private Limited is also registered with SEBI as a member of the National Stock Exchange of India Limited (SEBI Registration Number - INB 230675231/INF 230675231/INE 230675231), the Bombay Stock Exchange Limited (SEBI Registration Number - INB 010675237/INF 010675237) and as a Merchant Banker (SEBI Registration Number - MB/INM000002970). Telephone: 91-22-6157 3000, Facsimile: 91-22-6157 3990 and Website: [www.jpmpil.com](http://www.jpmpil.com). For non local research reports, this material is not distributed in India by J.P. Morgan India Private Limited. **Thailand:** This material is issued and distributed in Thailand by JPMorgan Securities (Thailand) Ltd., which is a member of the Stock Exchange of Thailand and is regulated by the Ministry of Finance and the Securities and Exchange Commission and its registered address is 3rd Floor, 20 North Sathorn Road, Silom, Bangkok, Bangkok 10500. **Indonesia:** PT J.P. Morgan Securities Indonesia is a member of the Indonesia Stock Exchange and is regulated by the OJK a.k.a. BAPEPAM LK. **Philippines:** J.P. Morgan Securities Philippines Inc. is a Trading Participant of the Philippine Stock Exchange and a member of the Securities Clearing Corporation of the Philippines and the Securities Investor Protection Fund. It is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. **Brazil:** Banco J.P. Morgan S.A. is regulated by the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) and by the Central Bank of Brazil. **Mexico:** J.P. Morgan Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V., J.P. Morgan Grupo Financiero is a member of the Mexican Stock Exchange and authorized to act as a broker dealer by the National Banking

# Disclosures

and Securities Exchange Commission. **Singapore:** This material is issued and distributed in Singapore by or through J.P. Morgan Securities Singapore Private Limited (JPMS) [MCI (P) 202/03/2017 and Co. Reg. No.: 199405335R], which is a member of the Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Limited and/or JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Singapore branch (JPMCB Singapore) [MCI (P) 089/09/2016], both of which are regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. This material is issued and distributed in Singapore only to accredited investors, expert investors and institutional investors, as defined in Section 4A of the Securities and Futures Act, Cap. 289 (SFA). This material is not intended to be issued or distributed to any retail investors or any other investors that do not fall into the classes of "accredited investors," "expert investors" or "institutional investors," as defined under Section 4A of the SFA. Recipients of this document are to contact JPMS or JPMCB Singapore in respect of any matters arising from, or in connection with, the document. **Japan:** JPMorgan Securities Japan Co., Ltd. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Tokyo Branch are regulated by the Financial Services Agency in Japan. **Malaysia:** This material is issued and distributed in Malaysia by JPMorgan Securities (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (18146-X) which is a Participating Organization of Bursa Malaysia Berhad and a holder of Capital Markets Services License issued by the Securities Commission in Malaysia. **Pakistan:** J. P. Morgan Pakistan Broking (Pvt.) Ltd is a member of the Karachi Stock Exchange and regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. **Saudi Arabia:** J.P. Morgan Saudi Arabia Ltd. is authorized by the Capital Market Authority of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (CMA) to carry out dealing as an agent, arranging, advising and custody, with respect to securities business under licence number 35-07079 and its registered address is at 8th Floor, Al-Faisaliyah Tower, King Fahad Road, P.O. Box 51907, Riyadh 11553, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. **Dubai:** JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Dubai Branch is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) and its registered address is Dubai International Financial Centre - Building 3, Level 7, PO Box 506551, Dubai, UAE.

## Country and Region Specific Disclosures

**U.K. and European Economic Area (EEA):** Unless specified to the contrary, issued and approved for distribution in the U.K. and the EEA by JPMS plc. Investment research issued by JPMS plc has been prepared in accordance with JPMS plc's policies for managing conflicts of interest arising as a result of publication and distribution of investment research. Many European regulators require a firm to establish, implement and maintain such a policy. Further information about J.P. Morgan's conflict of interest policy and a description of the effective internal organisations and administrative arrangements set up for the prevention and avoidance of conflicts of interest is set out at the following link <https://www.jpmmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320678075935.pdf>. This report has been issued in the U.K. only to persons of a kind described in Article 19 (5), 38, 47 and 49 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (all such persons being referred to as "relevant persons"). This document must not be acted on or relied on by persons who are not relevant persons. Any investment or investment activity to which this document relates is only available to relevant persons and will be engaged in only with relevant persons. In other EEA countries, the report has been issued to persons regarded as professional investors (or equivalent) in their home jurisdiction. **Australia:** This material is issued and distributed by JPMSAL in Australia to "wholesale clients" only. This material does not take into account the specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of the recipient. The recipient of this material must not distribute it to any third party or outside Australia without the prior written consent of JPMSAL. For the purposes of this paragraph the term "wholesale client" has the meaning given in section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. **Germany:** This material is distributed in Germany by J.P. Morgan Securities plc, Frankfurt Branch which is regulated by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht. **Hong Kong:** The 1% ownership disclosure as of the previous month end satisfies the requirements under Paragraph 16.5(a) of the Hong Kong Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures Commission. (For research published within the first ten days of the month, the disclosure may be based on the month end data from two months prior.) J.P. Morgan Broking (Hong Kong) Limited is the liquidity provider/market maker for derivative warrants, callable bull bear contracts and stock options listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited. An updated list can be found on HKEx website: <http://www.hkex.com.hk>. **Japan:** There is a risk that a loss may occur due to a change in the price of the shares in the case of share trading, and that a loss may occur due to the exchange rate in the case of foreign share trading. In the case of share trading, JPMorgan Securities Japan Co., Ltd., will be receiving a brokerage fee and consumption tax (shouhizei) calculated by multiplying the executed price by the commission rate which was individually agreed between JPMorgan Securities Japan Co., Ltd., and the customer in advance. Financial Instruments Firms: JPMorgan Securities Japan Co., Ltd., Kanto Local Finance Bureau (kinsho) No. 82 Participating Association / Japan Securities Dealers Association, The Financial Futures Association of Japan, Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association and Japan Investment Advisers Association. **Korea:** This report may have been edited or contributed to from time to time by affiliates of J.P. Morgan Securities (Far East) Limited, Seoul Branch. **Singapore:** As at the date of this report, JPMS is a designated market maker for certain structured warrants listed on the Singapore Exchange where the underlying securities may be the securities discussed in this report. Arising from its role as designated market maker for such structured warrants, JPMS may conduct hedging activities in respect of such underlying securities and hold or have an interest in such underlying securities as a result. The updated list of structured warrants for which JPMS acts as designated market maker may be found on the website of the Singapore Exchange Limited: <http://www.sgx.com.sg>. In addition, JPMS and/or its affiliates may also have an interest or holding in any of the securities discussed in this report – please see the Important Disclosures section above. For securities where the holding is 1% or greater, the holding may be found in the Important Disclosures section above. For all other securities mentioned in this report, JPMS and/or its affiliates may have a holding of less than 1% in such securities and may trade them in ways different from those discussed in this report. Employees of JPMS and/or its affiliates not involved in the preparation of this report may have investments in the securities (or derivatives of such securities) mentioned in this report and may trade them in ways different from those discussed in this report. **Taiwan:** This material is issued and distributed in Taiwan by J.P. Morgan Securities (Taiwan) Limited. According to Paragraph 2, Article 7-1 of Operational Regulations Governing Securities Firms Recommending Trades in Securities to Customers (as amended or supplemented) and/or other applicable laws or regulations, please note that the recipient of this material is not permitted to engage in any activities in connection with the material which may give rise to conflicts of interests, unless otherwise disclosed in the "Important Disclosures" in this material. **India:** For private circulation only, not for sale. **Pakistan:** For private circulation only, not for sale. **New Zealand:** This material is issued and distributed by JPMSAL in New Zealand only to persons whose principal business is the investment of money or who, in the course of and for the purposes of their business, habitually invest money. JPMSAL does not issue or distribute this material to members of "the public" as determined in accordance with section 3 of the Securities Act 1978. The recipient of this material must not distribute it to any third party or outside New Zealand without the prior written consent of JPMSAL. **Canada:** The information contained herein is not, and under no circumstances is to be construed as, a prospectus, an advertisement, a public offering, an offer to sell securities described herein, or solicitation of an offer to buy securities described herein, in Canada.

# Disclosures

or any province or territory thereof. Any offer or sale of the securities described herein in Canada will be made only under an exemption from the requirements to file a prospectus with the relevant Canadian securities regulators and only by a dealer properly registered under applicable securities laws or, alternatively, pursuant to an exemption from the dealer registration requirement in the relevant province or territory of Canada in which such offer or sale is made. The information contained herein is under no circumstances to be construed as investment advice in any province or territory of Canada and is not tailored to the needs of the recipient. To the extent that the information contained herein references securities of an issuer incorporated, formed or created under the laws of Canada or a province or territory of Canada, any trades in such securities must be conducted through a dealer registered in Canada. No securities commission or similar regulatory authority in Canada has reviewed or in any way passed judgment upon these materials, the information contained herein or the merits of the securities described herein, and any representation to the contrary is an offence. **Dubai:** This report has been issued to persons regarded as professional clients as defined under the DFSA rules. **Brazil:** Ombudsman J.P. Morgan: 0800-7700847 / ouvidoria.jp.morgan@jpmorgan.com.

**General:** Additional information is available upon request. Information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable but JPMorgan Chase & Co. or its affiliates and/or subsidiaries (collectively J.P. Morgan) do not warrant its completeness or accuracy except with respect to any disclosures relative to JPMS and/or its affiliates and the analyst's involvement with the issuer that is the subject of the research. All pricing is indicative as of the close of market for the securities discussed, unless otherwise stated. Opinions and estimates constitute our judgment as of the date of this material and are subject to change without notice. Past performance is not indicative of future results. This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument. The opinions and recommendations herein do not take into account individual client circumstances, objectives, or needs and are not intended as recommendations of particular securities, financial instruments or strategies to particular clients. The recipient of this report must make its own independent decisions regarding any securities or financial instruments mentioned herein. JPMS distributes in the U.S. research published by non-U.S. affiliates and accepts responsibility for its contents. Periodic updates may be provided on companies/industries based on company specific developments or announcements, market conditions or any other publicly available information. Clients should contact analysts and execute transactions through a J.P. Morgan subsidiary or affiliate in their home jurisdiction unless governing law permits otherwise.

"Other Disclosures" last revised April 22, 2017.

**Copyright 2017 JPMorgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved. This report or any portion hereof may not be reprinted, sold or redistributed without the written consent of J.P. Morgan.**

## **Pricing repo**

Michael Manna, Head of Fixed Income Financing Trading, EMEA  
& Asia Pacific, Barclays



*Barclays*

ICMA Professional Repo Market &  
Collateral Management Course 2017  
*Demystifying Repo Pricing*

1 June 2017

Michael Manna, Managing Director


Head of Fixed Income Financing Trading, EMEA



## Repo Pricing: Art or Science?

---

# What Determines the Repo Rate?



In addition to the attributes above, new regulation will add; binding constraints, change the way banks measure & report risk and force banks to rethink how they price the financial resources they provide to clients, which will influence how repo trades are priced



## A Bit of Background Before we go Further.....

---

Eonia

**Euro Over Night Index Average** - The weighted average rate of interest of unsecured overnight EUR trades for one particular day provided by a panel of contributing banks.

Euronia

**Euro Over Night Index Average** - The weighted average rate of interest of unsecured overnight EUR trades for one particular day provided by brokers (WMBA member firms).

Sonia

**Sterling Over Night Index Average** - The weighted average rate of interest of **unsecured** overnight trades for one particular day provided by brokers (WMBA member firms).

Ronia

**Repo Over Night Index Average** - The weighted average rate of interest of **secured** (vs Gilts) overnight GBP trades for one particular day.

# What is GC vs. a “Special” & How is it Priced?

## General Collateral


- GC, “general collateral” is the term used to describe the collateral pledged in a repo financing transaction
- The collateral pledged must comply with a cash lender's stipulation regarding what type of collateral will be accepted
  - Profile primarily based on rating and country of domicile
- The GC curve will trade relative to an interest rate curve (e.g. Eonia Sonia, OIS)
  - The GC curve will price in both liquidity and risk premium (counterparty and collateral)

## Specials / Specifics


*One mans GC is another man's special*

- “Specific” is the term used to describe a unique security request
- “Special” is the term used to describe the value of the security
- Example: the 1 month GC market is 0.25 –0.20%
  - “I need the DBR .50% 15Feb25 for 1mo”, quoted market could be 0.20–0.10%
- What makes a bond special?
  - More demand than supply
    - Guaranteed delivery situation (e.g. delivery for a contract)
    - Event driven: auction, corporate action
  - Issue size
  - Distribution of supply / bonds are ‘boxed’
  - A bonds lender has a minimum return to lend threshold, “ I’ll only lend if can make a 20bp return”


## General Curve



## Specials Curve




# The Flow of “Specials”: A Complex Web




- At times, covering a short position may require navigating a complex web of relationships. The more connected counterparties become the better the liquidity is for finding bonds to cover short positions
- Regulation could sever or greatly reduce the capacity and / or the connection points resulting in;
  - Bonds becoming more difficult to source which leads to bonds becoming more expensive, impacting the returns of the underlying trades and cash market liquidity
  - Borrowing costs could also increase because of a trade's RWA or Balance Sheet return metrics

# 2016: GC Starts Turning *Special*?


Rising Impact from Specials<sup>(1)</sup>



PSPP Cumulative Holdings (€mm)<sup>(2)</sup>



Number of Bonds Trading >10bps Through GC<sup>(3)</sup>



1. ECB, Bloomberg, and Barclays Data; 2. ECB; 3. Barclays Data

# Repo Specials: *If you're keen on the Subject.....*

---

A ECB Working Paper Series  
The Importance of being special: repo marker during the crisis  
*By Stefano Corradin and Angela Maddaloni*

## Extract 5. Explorative analysis of specialness


We estimate daily OLS panel regressions with bond and time fixed effects. Standards errors are clustered at the bond and time level.<sup>17</sup>

Our basic pooled fixed –effects panel regression specification is:

$$S_{i,t} = \beta_1 S_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 X_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \tilde{X}_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \theta + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$

# The Secured vs. Unsecured Paradox

Funding markets in Europe have become segmented. When it comes to secured vs. unsecured funding there are obvious anomalies. It's hard to isolate all of the reasons, however 2 factors which are influencing the landscape are: (1) new regulation: specifically LCR which impacts a banks' appetite for short term unsecured funding. (2) Lack of fungibility between the secured and unsecured markets (i.e. adoption of repo as an investment product)



\* Data as of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Feb 2014.



## Cash and Repo Market Relationship

---

# The Cash & Repo Market Relationship

Both repo transactions and bond positions represent cash flows. How one influences the other can be observed in cost of carry and forward break-even analysis. This type of analysis becomes particularly relevant when considering relative value trading strategies


UKT 0.50% 1/21: Purchase & Finance @ .50%

BOND COST OF CARRY									
TREASURY	UKT1 ½	01/22/21	103.014/103.063	(0.858/0.847)	BARX				
SETTLEMENT DATE	4/ 4/16	FIX (PRICE or 2=YIELD )	2	COMPOUNDING METHOD	2	[1= CD COMPOUND 2= PROCEEDS 3= SCIENTIFIC]			
PRICE	103.063000	ACCRUED INTEREST	0.300824						
YIELD	0.84731								
WORKOUT DATE	1/22/21	-VALUE	100.000						
	CHOOSE:	BUSINESS OR CALENDAR DAYS C							
COST OF CARRY									
REPO RATE	0.5	1 = REPO or 2 = REVERSE	1	BASIS-ACT/365	365				
	REPO	B. P.	PRICE	NET P & L FOR	BREAKEVEN				
TERMINATION DATE	EQUIV	SPREAD	PICK UP	1000	(M)FACE	PRICE	/YIELD		
NEXT DAY ( 4/ 5/16)	0.848	34.8	0.0010	9.85	103.060295/	0.847512			
30 DAYS ( 5/ 4/16)	0.848	34.8	0.0296	295.77	102.981852/	0.853609			
2)INFLATION ASSUMPTION									

UKT 0.50% 1/26: Sell Shat & Cover @ .10%

BOND COST OF CARRY									
TREASURY		UKT1 ½		07/22/26	99.277/99.358		(1.576/1.568)		BARX
SETTLEMENT DATE	4/ 4/16		FIX (PRICE or 2=YIELD )		2		COMPOUNDING METHOD		
PRICE	99.358000		ACCRUED INTEREST		0.189560		2 [1= CD COMPOUND		
YIELD	1.56773						2= PROCEEDS		
WORKOUT DATE	7/22/26		-VALUE 100.000				3= SCIENTIFIC]		
CHOOSE:			BUSINESS OR CALENDAR DAYS C						
BOND BORROW									
1 = REGULAR or 2 = FED. 1									
TERMINATION DATE		B. P.		PRICE	NET P & L FOR		BREAKEVEN		
		SPREAD		PICK UP	500	(M)FACE	PRICE	/YIELD	
NEXT DAY ( 4/ 5/16)		146.0		-0.0040		-19.91	99.362132/	1.567303	
30 DAYS ( 5/ 4/16)		146.0		-0.1195		-597.29	99.482035/	1.554990	
*** CALENDAR DAYS USED ***									

Shape of the Curve but What about the Carry?






# The Cash & Repo Market Relationship

Understanding which factors have an influence on the relationships isn't always clear

BTP 4.75% August 2023




Source: MTS & Barclays.

# The Cash & Repo Market Relationship

Does the repo market impact pricing and liquidity in the cash market or does the cash market impact price and liquidity in the repo market?

The simple bi-partisan answer is, liquidity is the main attribute needed for the healthy functioning of both markets.



How could regulation impact the cycle?  
Add to that question, what happens if you have QE?


# 2016: What Happened at Year End?

## Where's the smoking gun(s)?


Not one but a number of factors may have contributed to the price action we experienced:

1. Balance sheet constraints & Management
2. Cash hunting for a home
3. Lack of 'safe assets'
4. X-CCY basis
5. Cash market positioning
6. Levy/Tax policies influencing behaviour


## Was FX basis a factor?(<sup>1</sup>)



## Money Fund £ Weighted Average Rate(<sup>2</sup>)



## Money Fund € Weighted Average Rate(<sup>2</sup>)



1. Barclays and Bloomberg Data; 2.. Craine Data

---

The sections we just covered was an overview of  
repo pricing in the academic sense.  
Now we'll explore how new regulation has  
fundamentally changed the way we measure our  
PnL and price repo transactions.



## Regulation & the Impact on Repo Pricing


---

# No Need to Wait ....

## Already Rules Begin to Influence Secured Funding Activity

Banks are unlikely to wait until 2019 to become fully compliant. In efforts to achieve early compliance one could say the banks are already beginning to control the amount and cost of leverage they are providing and influencing the “velocity of collateral”.

- Capital – Is the binding constraint which sizes the capacity and drives business metrics (i.e. return on capital)
  - Leverage Ratio – Repo not only contributes on an accounting based measure but also a ‘risk add-on’ has been adopted to capture credit risk
  - Capital Ratio – A risk based measure of activity, taking into account counterparty credit & market risk in SFTs
    - This will influence haircut policies and thus deem certain trades un-commercial for both banks and non-banks
- Liquidity – Rule based approach, prevents Matched Books becoming too skewed towards volatile and / or less liquid assets given LCR avoiding the “cliff effect”
- Disclosure – Enhanced transparency by the banks, moving towards a more uniform basis for reporting. For example, the adoption of an average view of the leverage vs. point-in-time view



\* Manmohan Singh, IMF.

# Risk Weighted Approach (RWA) “Capital Ratio”?


Attempts to measure the quality of assets/transactions supported by available capital. The amount of Market, Credit, and Operational risk appetite is ‘sized’ by our capital. In other words combining the value of these risks a bank needs to answer the question, “Does my capital base support these activities?”

## What risks are being measured?

- **Market Risk** is the risk of the Group’s earnings or capital being reduced due to volatility of trading book positions or an inability to hedge the banking book balance sheet.
- **Credit Risk** is the risk of suffering financial loss should any of the Group’s customers, clients or market counterparties fail to fulfil their contractual obligations to the Group.
- **Operational Risk** is defined as the risk of direct or indirect impacts resulting from human factors, inadequate or failed internal processes and systems or external events.

- The amount of capital a bank holds must be sufficient to buffer against losses created by these risks.
- The “A” in RWA is misleading. It measures not only assets on the balance sheet but the credit & market risk exposure associated with assets & liabilities for on & off balance sheet activities.
- Calculation:  $\frac{CET1}{RWA}$
- Barclays Minimum Target by 2019 is 10.8%<sup>(1)</sup>
  - CRD IV CET1 4.5%
  - Pillar 2A CET1 2.3%
  - Capital Conservation Buffer <sup>(2)</sup> (CCB) 2.5%
  - G-SIB<sup>(3)</sup> CET1 1.5% (subject to change)

Barclay RWAs and CET1




1. [https://www.home.barclays/content/dam/barclayspublic/docs/InvestorRelations/ResultAnnouncements/2016FYResults/20170223\\_Barclays\\_2016\\_FI\\_Investor\\_Presentation.pdf](https://www.home.barclays/content/dam/barclayspublic/docs/InvestorRelations/ResultAnnouncements/2016FYResults/20170223_Barclays_2016_FI_Investor_Presentation.pdf)  
 2. <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pr/Documents/publications/reports/prstatement0316.pdf>  
 3. G-SIFI - Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions. G-SIB is also used, Globally Systemically Important Banks. See annex for full list.

# Risk Weighted Approach (RWA): Simple Example

Repo transactions attract primarily two types of risk: counterparty and market risk. This risk is mitigated by taking haircuts which ensure minimal capital is required to support a repo transaction.

$$\text{RWA} = \text{Exposure at Default} \times \text{Counterparty Risk Weighting}$$



Asset Side RWA Calculation Assumption

Client Type	Hedge Fund	Bank (A Rated)
Counterparty Risk Weighting	100%	50%
Collateral Type	High Yield	High Yield
Notional	\$100,000,000	\$100,000,000
Term	1 year	1 year
Bases Point Spread	25bp	25bp
Trade Revenue	\$250,000.00	\$250,000.00
Risk Covering Haircut Assumption	≥17%	≥17%



# The “Leverage Ratio” Explained

“A non-risk based leverage ratio that includes off-balance sheet exposures will serve as a backstop to the risk based capital requirement also. Also helps contain system wide build up of leverage” - BCBS

**The Leverage Ratio is the simplest, most straight-forward risk measurement tool**

Banks adopt internal models for calculating RWAs, but this creates an uneven playing field when analyzing between banks. Leverage ratio, once you've adjusted for the different accounting standards, gives you a better comparison, albeit only on the size of the leverage/assets and not the quality (risk adjusted) of the assets.

Calculation: 
$$\frac{\text{CET1}}{\text{Total Expose measure}}$$

Compliance for the new Basel III leverage ratio is targeted for 1<sup>st</sup> Jan 2018.  
While running parallel the years leading up to the implementation

This will be reported in the form of an **average leverage ratio**.  
Maximum 33.3x leverage or minimum 3% of capital as a percentage of total exposure measure.  
Under US proposed rules it will be 5% or 6% (US GAAP accounting).

1. Common Equity Tier (CET1) / Basel III “Good Equity”.  
2. “AGL” – Adjusted Gross Leverage.

---

### Basel III Leverage Ratio

$$\frac{\text{CET1}}{\text{Total Exposure measure}}$$


*E-C*

$$\text{Exposure} - \text{Collateral} = \text{Exposure}$$

$$\text{Exposure} = \text{Leverage}$$

# Repo Netting, E-C and Pricing

The new model uses both the accounting based measure and has an add-on for exposure. This add-on is net Exposure – Collateral per counterparty netting set (i.e. same counterparty only).



# The Leverage Ratio: Feeling the Effects


	Old World AGL <sup>(2)</sup>	New World CRD IV / PRA / BCBS270						
Calculation is:	$\frac{\text{Tier 1 capital}}{\text{Total Adjusted Assets}}$	$\frac{\text{CETI}^{(1)}}{\text{Total Exposure Measure}}$						
	Old World	New World						
	Dec-12	Dec-12	Dec-13	Jun-14	Dec-14	Dec-15	Dec-16	
				PRA	BCBS270			
Asset	£975bn	£1,498bn	£1,377bn	£1,266bn	£1,353bn	£1,233bn	£1,028bn	£1,125bn
Capital	£51.6bn	£37.3bn	£42.7bn	£43.2bn	£45.4bn	£46.0bn	£46.2bn	£52.0bn
Leverage Ratio (multiple)	18.9x	40x	32.2x	29.3x	29.8x	26.8x	22.2x	21.6x
Leverage Ratio (%)	5.2%	2.5%	3.1%	3.41%	3.36%	3.70%	4.50%	4.3% /4.6% <sup>(4)</sup>
BoE /PRA Adjustment <sup>(3)</sup>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4.6%/5.0%
<b>Securities Financing Transactions (SFT)</b>								
IFRS Accounting 'Classic'	£177bn	£177bn	£187bn	–	£199bn	£132bn	£78bn	£76bn
CRD IV (FCCM)	–	£119bn	£92bn	£60bn	–	–	–	–
BCBS270 (IFRS + Exposure)	–	–	–	–	£228bn	£157bn	£94bn	£105bn
Secured Financing as a % of Assets	18%	7.9%	6.7%	4.7%	16.9%	12.7%	9.1%	9.3%
E-C Add-on Amount	–	–	–	–	£29bn	£25bn	£16bn	£29bn

Source: Barclays Financial Reports 2012-2015.

1. Common Equity Tier (CET1) / Basel III "Good Equity". Includes AT1.. 2. "AGL" – Adjusted Gross Leverage, 3. BoE, <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2016/008.aspx/>  
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pr/pr/Documents/publications/reports/prstatement0816.pdf>, 4. Avg./31Dec LBS

# 2017: The Leverage Landscape


We are fast approaching 2019 and banks are busy executing their publically stated capital and leverage plans. The leverage solutions take the form of either deleverage and /or increase capital base. Also worth noting currently only 3 jurisdictions in this sample have binding leverage rules (US, UK & Switzerland).



Source: Barclays Research  
Note: US Banks based on GAAP.

# Balance Sheet Capacity: Reporting

In the past, intra-quarter end leverage increases were standard market practice. Now that leverage is a key focus, reporting is done on an average basis rather than at specific points in time, thus avoiding the opportunity for 'window dressing'. This reduces volatility but also reduces the repo balance sheet between the traditional reporting periods.



This type of behaviour is not only limited to Repo but any activity which is easy to 'dial up and down' and impacts leverage. Examples include cash trading and a bank's treasury desk taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities.

Liquidity Risk:  
*LCR & NSFR*

---

# Liquidity: LCR & NSFR

Financial leverage (repo or margin lending) requires certain elements to support it. Capital, in the form of balance sheet, which is binary (you either have it or you don't) and Liquidity, which is dependant on the cost associated to obtain it will determine the price at which you can facilitate leverage. Historically, banks would keep funding costs "competitive" by accepting liquidity mismatch risk through the classic lend long borrow short strategy.

The Basel III regulation gives special focus to liquidity risk, the rules are captured in the LCR and NSFR


## LCR

- LCR is designed to address a stressed funding scenario of 30 days. It requires banks to hold sufficient levels of liquid assets (HQLA) to cover a net outflow expected in the stress scenario (lasting 30 days). Some banks have taken additional steps to protect themselves further by also managing to a 90 day period (e.g., per the past UK PRA requirements).
- The negative effects seems to have been minimal given; duration is in line with available liquidity, the quantum of excess liquidity conditions and the hunt for yield has helped facilitate a smooth adoption.

## NSFR

- NSFR is designed to look at the longer-term liquidity mismatches and to incentivise banks to seek stable sources of funding, i.e., raise funding > 1 year and applies "qualitative factors" to funding sources.
- The SFTs and unencumbered cash trading positions are shorted dated by nature, meaning the liabilities to support them are more in line with LCR rules then NSFR, i.e., 30 days vs 1year).

## LCR & NSFR Applied to the Repo Market





Sources:

1. Financial Conduct Authority, Hedge fund Survey June 2015.
2. ICMA, European Repo market Survey. Repo weighted average maturity profile.



# Liquidity: How Could it Impact Repo Pricing?

Assuming a repo matched book is self financed, how it generates liabilities will have an impact on the cost of funding. In the UK the regulator was first to implement a liquidity framework measuring contingent liquidity risk. Changing funding profiles to avoid the “*cliff effect*”. Part of the framework also addressed counterparty concentration which limits your ability to always source the cheapest cost of funding.



- In an environment where repo is NOT subject to a regulated liquidity framework, the pool of liquidity is broad and deep relative to asset class.
- Price was the primary driver of behaviour and influenced the matched book funding composition.
- When repo funding must comply to regulated liquidity rules, liquidity becomes fragmented and the “right” type of liquidity becomes limited.
- The limitations result from the fact that liquidity providers don’t have an appetite to increase risk or the infrastructure to manage the exposure of new trade types.
- This limitation could impact the cost of funding for certain asset classes with the effect transferred to asset pricing depending how much leverage is being used.

# Liquidity: Transfer Pricing Influences

In the past the real cost of a firm's liquidity wasn't appropriately transferred to business units. This created an environment where business models were built on a false cost of liquidity. This created the opportunity for moral hazard. Under the new framework, this has been eliminated and will have an impact on repo pricing.


"A key weakness in firms' liquidity risk management has been designing and implementing an appropriate transfer pricing mechanism to align the commercial incentives in relation to individual products, business lines..."

*FSA PS 09/16*

"...These transfer pricing mechanisms are designed to ensure that liquidity risk is reflected in product pricing and performance measurement, thereby ensuring that the Liquidity Framework is integrated into business level decision making to drive the appropriate mix of sources and uses of funds"

*Barclays 2013 Annual Report*

Haircuts, Transfer Pricing, and the Impact on Repo



Gross Repo RATE	Haircut	Internal FTP	Net Repo Rate
0.25%	1%	1.5%	0.263%
0.25%	2%	1.5%	0.275%
0.25%	5%	1.5%	0.320%


# Liquidity: Top of the House vs Desk Level Compliance

When reporting, banks will provide an aggregate, “Top of the House” view in the form of a numerical ratio or statement of compliance. One key difference between LCR and NSFR is that LCR has to be managed at an operating entity level. Whereas NSFR is the group level. How, when or if these rules are applied and if (pushed down) to individual business areas will determine the ultimate impact on individual business lines.

Recent Company LCR & NSFR Reporting<sup>(1)</sup>

Banks	LCR	Last Reported	NSFR	Last Reported
HSBC	136%	Q4-16	116%	Q4-16
JP Morgan	-	-	-	-
Barclays	131%	Q4-16	>100%	Q4-16
BNP Paribas	123%	Q4-16	-	-
Citigroup	121%	Q4-16	>100%	Q4-16
Deutsche Bank	128%	Q4-16	-	-
Bank of America	>100%	Q4-16	-	-
Credit Suisse	202%	Q4-16	-	-
Goldman Sachs	-	-	-	-
Morgan Stanley	-	-	-	-
RBS	123%	Q4-16	121%	Q4-16

EBA NSFR Monitoring Results<sup>(2)(3)</sup>




Source:

1. Most recent Company Reports/Disclosure.

2. EBA - Draft report on the calibration of a stable funding requirement under Article 510 CRR, London 15 Oct 15.

3. Data Source: QIS and EBA Monitoring Exercise, Consistent sample of 123 credit institutions.



# NSFR Sample Portfolio

A simple sample portfolio and assuming NSFR is managed at a group level, the following table illustrates the spirit of NSFR, the impact of non-compliance and consequences regarding levered balance sheet.

	NSFR Counterparty Combo	NSFR Ratio (≥ 100%)	Compliance	Additional >1year Funding Required
SFT Transactions				
Example #1	Sovereign vs. Financial	0%	No	€50.75m
Example #2	Sovereign vs. Non-Financial	100%	Yes	€0.00m
Example #3	Financial (L1) vs. Financial	0%	No	€10.15m
Example #4	Financial (L1) vs. Financial (CCP)	0%	No	€10.15m
Example #5	Financial (L2b: Credit) vs. Financial	0%	No	€15.34m
Example #6	Financial (L2b:Equity) vs. Financial	0%	No	€75.00m
Example #7	Financial (L1) vs. Financial – LT	50%	No	€50.75m
Total SFT Portfolio Requirement				€212.14m (Deficit of Stable funding)
Unencumbered Assets (Cash Desk Positions)				
Example #8	Unencumbered Level1 vs. Financial	0%	No	€5.8m
Example #9	Unencumbered Level1 vs. non-Financial	>100%	Yes	-€45.68m (Excess Stable Funding)
Example #10	Unencumbered Level2b vs. Financial	0%	No	€15.5m
Example #11	Unencumbered Level2b vs. non-Financial	100%	Yes	€0.00m
Total Unencumbered Assets (Cash Trading Position) Portfolio Requirement				-€24.38m (Excess Stable Funding)
Total Portfolio Requirement				€ 187.76 (Deficit of Stable funding)

# NSFR Sample Portfolio: Consequences - Cost & Balance Sheet

- Non-Compliance of NSFR requires firms to increase their long term funding, > 1 Year Funding
- In this example portfolio

£1.375Bln of Balance Sheet Transactions  
*"Which are Already Funded"*

Requires

£187.76  
of > 1 Year of Funding


- Assuming NSFR is managed at a global level, the additional funding would lead to an increase of HQLA holdings which would have obvious implications on leverage balance sheet

+ £187.76 of New 1 Year Liabilities

Bank's Balance Sheet  
**Impact**  
£187.76m or 13.7% Increase

+ £187.76 of New HQLA


- As banks become more sophisticated in passing through regulatory costs to the end user, the 'cost' associated with the extra liquidity requirements could impact return metrics both in the form of additional funding costs and associated balance sheet allocation



# Recap: Regulation and Price

Basel III is actually very simple.

Everything is about CAPITAL, the good stuff, loss absorbing and expensive to raise. The amount of capital a bank holds will influence both the size and shape of businesses that can be supported. Businesses will be measured against their use of capital by both: how much they need to support required leverage and/or the amount of risk it takes.



# Influence on Capacity and Pricing?

Repo matched books will need to balance two resources



Assuming demand for leverage remains constant across asset classes and repo matched book revenue targets remain unchanged. In order to achieve revenue objectives, spreads and/or matched book composition could change.

Past	Present
Matched Book Size €100bln	Matched Book Size €60bln
<b>Composition</b> 50% Gov't 30% Credit 20% EM	<b>Composition</b> 40% Credit 30% EM 30% Gov't
WAM 45 Days	WAM 95 Days

Equity Financing which funds at a wider spread than certain Fixed Income assets could determine how resources are allocated.

1. Minimum value excluding G-SIB add on.

# Repo Returns Under Capital (RoRWA)?

Assumptions	
BCBS 270 Balance Sheet	£1bln
PnL Flat 1YR Run Rate	100bp
Counterparty Risk Weight (CP-RW)	100%
FCCM Volatility Adjustment Haircut*	7% <sup>(2)</sup>
Hair Cut Applied to Client Trades	0%
Target RoE	12%
Operating Assumptions <sup>(2)</sup>	
Cost / Income Ratio	55%
Tax Rate	35%

How many RWA's are produced with the given trade assumption?

RWA = EAD x CPRW  
 EAD: £1bln x 7% = 70m  
 CPRW: 100%  
 RWA = 70m

How much capital do I need to support 70m of RWA?

$$11\% = \frac{£70m}{X} \rightarrow X = £7.7m$$

How much gross revenue do I generate?

$$£1bln \times 100bp = £10m$$

What is my NET revenue?

$$PBT: £10m - C/I \text{ Ratio} = £4.5m$$

$$\text{Net Income: } £4.5m - \text{Tax} = £2.925m$$

What do my returns based on RWA exposure look like?

Return on RWA		
Gross	PBT	NET
$\frac{£10m}{£7.7m} = 130\%$	$\frac{£4.5m}{£7.7m} = 58\%$	$\frac{£2.9m}{£7.7m} = 38\%$

1. Note: Figures are illustrative ONLY.

2. Source: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:176:0001:0337:EN:PDF> Figure is a blended Rate to simply illustrate and example.



# Repo Returns Under Leverage Returns (RoLBS)?

Assumptions	
BCBS 270 Balance Sheet	£1bln
PnL Flat 1YR Run Rate	100bp
Target RoE	12%
Operating Assumptions <sup>(1)</sup>	
Cost / Income (C/I) Ratio	55%
Tax Rate	35%

How much capital does a bank need to support £1bln of Repo?

$$4\% = \frac{X}{£1bln} \rightarrow X = £40m$$

How much gross revenue do I generate?

$$£1bln \times 100bp = £10m$$

What is my NET revenue?

$$PBT: £10m - C/I \text{ Ratio} = £4.5m$$

$$\text{Net Income: } £4.5m - 35\% \text{ Tax Rate} = £2.925m$$

What do my Repo returns on leverage balance sheet look like?

Return on Leverage Balance Sheet (LBS)

Gross

$$\frac{£10m}{£40m} = 25\%$$

PBT<sup>(2)</sup>

$$\frac{£4.5m}{£40m} = 11.25\%$$

NET

$$\frac{£2.9m}{£40m} = 7.3\%$$

**To achieve a 12% targeted return**

Increase revenue by £6.4m (+64%)

Reduce Balance sheet to £610m (-39%)

1. Note: Figures illustrative ONLY.  
2. PBT = Pre Tax Profit.

---

**Thank you**

# General Conflict Disclosure & Disclaimer

---

## **BARCLAYS**

This communication has been prepared by Barclays.

“Barclays” means any entity within the Barclays Group of companies, where “Barclays Group” means Barclays Bank PLC, Barclays PLC and any of their subsidiaries, affiliates, ultimate holding company and any subsidiaries or affiliates of such holding company.

## **CONFLICTS OF INTEREST**

**BARCLAYS IS A FULL SERVICE INVESTMENT BANK.** In the normal course of offering investment banking products and services to clients, Barclays may act in several capacities (including issuer, market maker and/or liquidity provider, underwriter, distributor, index sponsor, swap counterparty and calculation agent) simultaneously with respect to a product, giving rise to potential conflicts of interest which may impact the performance of a product.

## **NOT RESEARCH**

This document is from a Barclays Trading and/or Distribution desk and is not a product of the Barclays Research department. Any views expressed may differ from those of Barclays Research.

## **BARCLAYS POSITIONS**

Barclays may at any time acquire, hold or dispose of long or short positions (including hedging and trading positions) and trade or otherwise effect transactions for their own account or the account of their customers in the products referred to herein which may impact the performance of a product.

## **FOR INFORMATION ONLY**

THIS COMMUNICATION IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY AND IT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE. IT IS INDICATIVE ONLY AND IS NOT BINDING.

## **NO OFFER**

Barclays is not offering to sell or seeking offers to buy any product or enter into any transaction. Any offer or entry into any transaction requires Barclays’ subsequent formal agreement which will be subject to internal approvals and execution of binding transaction documents.

## **NO LIABILITY**

Neither Barclays nor any of its directors, officers, employees, representatives or agents, accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct, indirect or consequential losses (in contract, tort or otherwise) arising from the use of this communication or its contents or reliance on the information contained herein, except to the extent this would be prohibited by law or regulation.

## **NO ADVICE**

Barclays is acting solely as principal and not as fiduciary. Barclays does not provide, and has not provided, any investment advice or personal recommendation to you in relation to the transaction and/or any related securities described herein and is not responsible for providing or arranging for the provision of any general financial, strategic or specialist advice, including legal, regulatory, accounting, model auditing or taxation advice or services or any other services in relation to the transaction and/or any related securities described herein. Accordingly Barclays is under no obligation to, and shall not, determine the suitability for you of the transaction described herein. You must determine, on your own behalf or through independent professional advice, the merits, terms, conditions and risks of the transaction described herein.

## **THIRD PARTY INFORMATION**

Barclays is not responsible for information stated to be obtained or derived from third party sources or statistical services.

## **PAST & SIMULATED PAST PERFORMANCE**

Any past or simulated past performance including back-testing, modelling or scenario analysis contained herein is no indication as to future performance.

No representation is made as to the accuracy of the assumptions made within, or completeness of, any modelling, scenario analysis or back-testing.

# General Conflict Disclosure & Disclaimer (Continued)

---

## OPINIONS SUBJECT TO CHANGE

All opinions and estimates are given as of the date hereof and are subject to change. The value of any investment may also fluctuate as a result of market changes. Barclays is not obliged to inform the recipients of this communication of any change to such opinions or estimates.

## NOT FOR RETAIL

This document is being directed at persons who are professionals and is not intended for retail customer use.

## IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES

For important regional disclosures you must read, visit the link relevant to your region. Please contact your Barclays representative if you are unable to access.

### EMEA

<https://www.home.barclays/disclosures/important-emea-disclosures.html>.

### APAC

<https://www.home.barclays/disclosures/important-apac-disclosures.html>.

### U.S.

<https://www.home.barclays/disclosures/important-us-disclosures.html>.

## CONFIDENTIAL

This communication is confidential and is for the benefit and internal use of the recipient for the purpose of considering the securities/transaction described herein, and no part of it may be reproduced, distributed or transmitted without the prior written permission of Barclays.

## ABOUT BARCLAYS

Barclays offers premier investment banking products and services to its clients through Barclays Bank PLC. Barclays Bank PLC is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority and is a member of the London Stock Exchange. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England No. 1026167 with its registered office at 1 Churchill Place, London E14 5HP.

## COPYRIGHT

© Copyright Barclays Bank PLC, 2017 (all rights reserved).

# Coffee break

## **The life cycle of a triparty repo trade**

Richard Glen, Senior Vice-President, Global Funding & Financing  
(GFF) Sales, Deutsche Boerse Group





DEUTSCHE BÖRSE  
GROUP

# ICMA Professional Repo & Collateral Management Course


## The lifecycle of a triparty repo trade

1 June 2017



# Global Funding & Financing


## What is triparty repo?





# Global Funding & Financing

## The mechanics of traditional triparty repo




1. Cash Provider sends an offer request to its preferred counterparties
2. Cash Taker provides a bid to the Cash Provider
3. If quote is accepted, both parties confirm full trade details
4. Trade details are routed to triparty agent as an RQV or triparty notification
5. CMAX confirms transaction matching and initiates opening and eligibility checks
6. DVP settlement
7. The triparty agent continues to value and manage the collateral throughout the lifecycle of the trade (opening, margin calls, substitutions, closing)

\*automated trading systems are starting to be introduced into triparty repo markets, in particular for B2C activities

# Global Funding & Financing


## Understanding the key elements of the operational lifecycle



# Global Funding & Financing

## Comparing traditional triparty repo and GC basket financing


In addition to traditional triparty repo arrangements, the ability to financing **general collateral (GC) baskets** via central counterparties has become more commonplace. This is largely down to an increasing demand for standardized baskets, an increasing use of technology across the securities finance value chain and regulatory pressures that encourage central clearing and promote the advantages of netting.



# Global Funding & Financing

## Collateral re-use opportunities and triparty repo


- Mobility and **velocity of collateral** has become more important in light of recent regulatory changes. Banks are focusing efforts more and more on **efficient inventory management** and looking to optimize their ability to re-use collateral as far as possible. In fact, the capital savings that can be achieved through the maximisation of **collateral efficiency** are yet to be realized by many financial institutions.



# Global Funding & Financing

## Getting started


To get started in triparty repo, you need to do the following



# Global Funding & Financing

## Legal set-up of triparty repo

To start trading in triparty repo, counterparties need both a **bilateral repo agreement** - industry standard (GMRA, MRA), local equivalent (DRV, FBF) or multilateral terms (CRC's) – plus a **triparty collateral management service agreement**. Both of these documents provide the legal framework for the relationship, the terms and conditions for the collateral management process as well as detail what happens in the event of a default or insolvency of a counterparty.




- Create eligibility rules based upon **single or multiple conditions**
- Rules can be used to define **eligibility, haircuts and concentration limits**
- Field values include:
  - Asset Class or Type
  - Credit Rating
  - Currency
  - Issuer or Risk Country
  - Underlying asset location
  - Indices or baskets
  - Industry sector
  - Issuer or UPID
  - Security identifier
  - Regulatory classification\*
- Eligibility rules can also be used by the collateral giver to trigger ad-hoc **portfolio optimisation**
- Eligibility rules are visible in via online portal or file download

# Global Funding & Financing

## Haircuts and concentration limits

Cash providers understand that they need to protect themselves from **market volatility** and **wrong-way risk**. For this reason, a triparty agent will provide all of its counterparties with different **haircut** and **concentration limit** options as part of its triparty collateral management process.





# Global Funding & Financing

## End-to-end connectivity

- As electronic trading and real-time processing grow in importance, **integrated end to end processing** is becoming standard features of triparty repo. In addition to supporting traditional **SWIFT** reporting options, triparty agents not only provide online portal access to clients but also have the ability to integrate **middleware** or **vendor solutions** as part of the overall lifecycle management workflow.

	Portal access	SWIFT	Trading venue
	Clearstream's online portal	Secure financial messaging	Multi-user triparty repo execution
<b>Simulation</b> • Forecast reports	Yes	-	-
<b>Execution*</b> • Price discovery	-	-	Yes
<b>Triparty notification</b> • Online entry • Upload	Yes Yes	- Yes	Yes Yes
<b>Reconciliation</b> • Matching • Statements • Real-time confirmation	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes - -
<b>Cash processing</b> • Cash instructions • Cash reporting	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	- -



### Transaction Lifecycle

- Forecast reports** show predicted pre-trade collateral availability positions
- Execution venues support **price discovery** as well as automated downstream processing
- Online entry or upload of triparty transactions by each counterparty is possible
- Full downstream processing** is automated and each stage in the lifecycle is tracked and reported
- Dedicated **collateral management reporting** can be provided
- Standard settlement and **position reconciliation** reporting is also available
- Cash management** and funding reporting is also offered as standard
- Bespoke reporting** options can also be supported.

# Global Funding & Financing

## Triparty repo – a summary

- As triparty repo markets have evolved over time, triparty agents have been asked to make their services more **flexible** and **comprehensive** for their clients. The following lists the key points that anyone needs to consider when looking to select the most appropriate triparty repo solution.





If you have any questions, please contact

**Richard Glen**

Senior Vice-President, Clearstream Banking S.A., London Branch  
Deutsche Boerse Group

**Global Funding & Financing – Sales**

tel +44 207 862 7142

e-mail [richard.glen@deutsche-boerse.com](mailto:richard.glen@deutsche-boerse.com)



clearstream



DEUTSCHE BÖRSE  
GROUP

Deutsche Börse AG (DBAG), Clearstream Banking AG (Clearstream), Eurex Frankfurt AG, Eurex Clearing AG (Eurex Clearing) as well as Eurex Bonds GmbH (Eurex Bonds) and Eurex Repo GmbH (Eurex Repo) are corporate entities and are registered under German law. Eurex Zürich AG is a corporate entity and is registered under Swiss law. Clearstream Banking S.A. is a corporate entity and is registered under Luxembourg law. U.S. Exchange Holdings, Inc. and International Securities Exchange Holdings, Inc. (ISE) are corporate entities and are registered under U.S. American law. Eurex Frankfurt AG (Eurex) is the administrating and operating institution of Eurex Deutschland. Eurex Deutschland and Eurex Zürich AG are in the following referred to as the "Eurex Exchanges".

All intellectual property, proprietary and other rights and interests in this publication and the subject matter hereof (other than certain trademarks and service marks listed below) are owned by DBAG and its affiliates and subsidiaries including, without limitation, all patent, registered design, copyright, trademark and service mark rights. While reasonable care has been taken in the preparation of this publication to provide details that are accurate and not misleading at the time of publication DBAG, Clearstream, Eurex, Eurex Clearing, Eurex Bonds, Eurex Repo as well as the Eurex Exchanges and their respective servants and agents (a) do not make any representations or warranties regarding the information contained herein, whether express or implied, including without limitation any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose or any warranty with respect to the accuracy, correctness, quality, completeness or timeliness of such information, and (b) shall not be responsible or liable for any third party's use of any information contained herein under any circumstances, including, without limitation, in connection with actual trading or otherwise or for any errors or omissions contained in this publication.

This publication is published for information purposes only and shall not constitute investment advice respectively does not constitute an offer, solicitation or recommendation to acquire or dispose of any investment or to engage in any other transaction. This publication is not intended for solicitation purposes but only for use as general information. All descriptions, examples and calculations contained in this publication are for illustrative purposes only.

Eurex and Eurex Clearing offer services directly to members of the Eurex exchanges respectively to clearing members of Eurex Clearing. Those who desire to trade any products available on the Eurex market or who desire to offer and sell any such products to others or who desire to possess a clearing license of Eurex Clearing in order to participate in the clearing process provided by Eurex Clearing, should consider legal and regulatory requirements of those jurisdictions relevant to them, as well as the risks associated with such products, before doing so.

Eurex derivatives are currently not available for offer, sale or trading in the United States or by United States persons (other than EURO STOXX 50® Index Futures, EURO STOXX 50® ex Financials Index Futures, EURO STOXX® Select Dividend 30 Index Futures, EURO STOXX® Index Futures, EURO STOXX® Large/Mid/Small Index Futures, STOXX® Europe 50 Index Futures, STOXX® Europe 600 Index Futures, STOXX® Europe 600 Banks/Industrial Goods & Services/Insurance/Media/Travel & Leisure/Utilities Futures, STOXX® Europe Large/Mid/Small 200 Index Futures, Dow Jones Global Titans 50 Index<sup>SM</sup> Futures (EUR & USD), DAX®/MDAX®/TecDAX® Futures, SMIM® Futures, SLI Swiss Leader Index® Futures, MSCI World/Europe/Europe Value/Europe Growth/Emerging Markets/Emerging Markets Latin America/Emerging Markets EMEA/Emerging Markets Asia/China Free/India/Japan/Malaysia/South Africa/Thailand/AC Asia Pacific ex Japan Index Futures, TA-25 Index Futures, Daily Futures on TAIEX V/Futures, VSTOXX® Futures, Gold and Silver Futures as well as Eurex agriculture, property and interest rate derivatives).

#### Trademarks and Service Marks

Buxi®, DAX®, DivDAX®, eb.rexx®, Eurex®, Eurex Bonds®, Eurex Repo®, Eurex Strategy Wizard<sup>SM</sup>, Euro GC Pooling®, FDAX®, FWB®, GC Pooling®, GCPI®, MDAX®, ODAX®, SDAX®, TecDAX®, USD GC Pooling®, VDAX®, VDAX-NEW® and Xetra® are registered trademarks of DBAG. All MSCI indexes are service marks and the exclusive property of MSCI Barra.

ATX®, ATX® five, CECE® and RDX® are registered trademarks of Vienna Stock Exchange AG. IPD® UK Annual All Property Index is a registered trademark of Investment Property Databank Ltd. IPD and has been licensed for the use by Eurex for derivatives. SLI®, SMI® and SMIM® are registered trademarks of SIX Swiss Exchange AG. The STOXX® indexes, the data included therein and the trademarks used in the index names are the intellectual property of STOXX Limited and/or its licensors. Eurex derivatives based on the STOXX® indexes are in no way sponsored, endorsed, sold or promoted by STOXX and its licensors and neither STOXX nor its licensors shall have any liability with respect thereto. Dow Jones, Dow Jones Global Titans 50 Index<sup>SM</sup> and Dow Jones Sector Titans Indexes<sup>SM</sup> are service marks of Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All derivatives based on these indexes are not sponsored, endorsed, sold or promoted by Dow Jones & Company, Inc. Dow Jones & Company, Inc. does not make any representation regarding the advisability of trading or of investing in such products. Bloomberg Commodity Index<sup>SM</sup> and any related sub-indexes are service marks of Bloomberg L.P. All references to London Gold and Silver Fixing prices are used with the permission of The London Gold Market Fixing Limited as well as The London Silver Market Fixing Limited, which for the avoidance of doubt has no involvement with and accepts no responsibility whatsoever for the underlying product to which the Fixing prices may be referenced. PCS® and Property Claim Services® are registered trademarks of ISO Services, Inc. Korea Exchange, KRX, KOSPI and KOSPI 200 are registered trademarks of Korea Exchange Inc. Taiwan Futures Exchange and TAIEX are registered trademarks of Taiwan Futures Exchange Corporation. Taiwan Stock Exchange, TWSE and TAIEX are the registered trademarks of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation. BSE and SENSEX are trademarks/service marks of Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and all rights accruing from the same, statutory or otherwise, wholly vest with BSE. Any violation of the above would constitute an offence under the laws of India and international treaties governing the same. The names of other companies and third party products may be trademarks or service marks of their respective owners.

## **An overview of the repo market: 15 years of the ICMA survey**

Richard Comotto, ICMA Centre at Reading University





## European Repo Council

32<sup>nd</sup> European repo market survey, conducted in December 2016

- **Mr. Richard Comotto**, Senior Visiting Fellow, ICMA Centre - Reading University
- 

## Survey overview


- outstanding value of contracts at close of business on Wednesday, 8th June 2016
- 65 responses (-2)

## Headline numbers

• <b>December 2016</b>	<b>EUR 5,656 billion</b>
• June 2016	EUR 5,379 billion
• December 2015	EUR 5,608 billion
• June 2015	EUR 5,612 billion
• December 2014	EUR 5,500 billion
• June 2014	EUR 5,782 billion
• December 2014	EUR 5,499 billion
• June 2013	EUR 6,076 billion
• December 2012	EUR 5,611 billion
• June 2012	EUR 5,647 billion
• December 2011	EUR 6,204 billion
• June 2011	EUR 6,124 billion
• December 2010	EUR 5,908 billion




## Headline numbers




## Comparable market growth

- headline number: +0.9% year-on-year; +5.2% since June 2016
- for 61 respondents participating in last 3 surveys: +0.8% year-on-year; +2.4% since June 2016


## Trading analysis



## Trading Analysis




## Trading analysis







## Trading Analysis (directly reported by providers)



## Geographical Analysis




## Geographical Analysis







## Geographical Analysis




## Geographic Analysis




## Business cleared across CCP



## Currency Analysis




## Currency Analysis







## Collateral Analysis



## Collateral Analysis --- Core Eurozone




## Collateral Analysis --- Peripheral Eurozone






## Collateral Analysis




## Collateral Analysis




## Collateral Analysis

### repo




net borrowing v credit

### reverse repo




net lending v gov bonds

## Maturity Analysis




## Maturity Analysis







## Maturity Analysis



## Maturity Analysis




## Maturity Analysis






## Maturity Analysis



## Rate Analysis



32<sup>nd</sup> European repo market survey conducted in December 2016

## Next Survey

Wednesday, 7<sup>th</sup> June 2017

# ICMA Workshop: Professional Repo and Collateral Management 1-2 June 2017

