Mandatory buy in provision of the EU CSDR

Overview

March 2020
Outline

- What is CSDR, Settlement Discipline, the mandatory buy-in regime, and its scope?
- What are the challenges for firms caught under the buy-in regime, and what are ICMA and others doing about it?
- What are the potential implications for bond market functioning and liquidity?
ICMA: CSDR-SD mandatory buy-ins

Outline

- What is CSDR, Settlement Discipline, the mandatory buy-in regime, and its scope?
What is CSD Regulation & CSDR Settlement Discipline?

- CSD Regulation (CSDR) is an EU regulation which introduces measures for the authorization and regulation of EU central securities depositories (CSDs).
- While much of the regulation focuses on the prudential, organizational, and business standards of CSDs, some of its requirements directly affect trading level entities that settle trades on EU CSDs. This includes measures to address settlement fails.
- Chapter III of the Regulation deals with Settlement Discipline. Article 7 provides for measures to address settlement fails, which includes cash penalties for settlement fails and mandatory buy-ins.
- CSDR entered into force in September 2014.
- The Settlement Discipline measures (including mandatory buy-ins) were due to come into force from September 2020, but ESMA has now submitted amended RTS with an implementation date of February 1, 2021.*

* This delay is purely technical, and largely due to the timing of the SWIFT messaging roll-out required to support the implementation of cash penalties in T2S.
The penalty mechanism will be administered by all EU (I)CSDs and apply to all settlement fails on those CSDs.

CSDs will apply penalties against failing participants and then pass this on to the failed-to-participant. The charges themselves are flat, ad valorem fees (expressed as a % of the market value of the relevant security). All CSDs will use the same daily reference price to calculate the market value of the relevant securities (to ensure consistency).

The charges are applied on a daily basis (per business day, rather than calendar day), and there are different charges depending on security type/asset class, and (in the case of shares) liquidity (as determined by MiFIR). The CSDs will apply the penalties/awards on a net basis at the end of each month.

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<tr>
<th>Type of fail/security</th>
<th>Penalty Rate</th>
<th>Equivalent repo rate cost</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liquid shares</td>
<td>1.00 bp</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illiquid shares</td>
<td>0.50 bp</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME growth instruments (non-debt)</td>
<td>0.25 bp</td>
<td>0.625%</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA bonds</td>
<td>0.10 bp</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
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<td>Non-SSA bonds</td>
<td>0.20 bp</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
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<td>SME debt instruments</td>
<td>0.15 bp</td>
<td>0.375%</td>
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<tr>
<td>All other financial instruments</td>
<td>0.50 bp</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fail due to lack of cash</td>
<td>Official overnight rate</td>
<td>Official overnight rate (≥0%)</td>
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1 As determined by Article 4(6)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 (MiFIR)
What is a CSDR mandatory buy-in?

- Executed at **trading level** (similar to conventional buy-in mechanisms).
- For non-centrally cleared trades, requires the appointment of a buy-in agent.
- Buy-in process is automatically triggered 4 business days after intended settlement date (ISD) for liquid equities, and **7 business days** after ISD for all other instruments, including bonds (called the “extension period”).
- Buy-in must be completed (settled) within 4 business days\(^1\) for liquid equities, and 7 business days for all other instruments.
- If buy-in is not possible, the non-defaulting party can initiate one more attempt (the “deferral period”). Otherwise the buy-in will result in “cash compensation”.
- SFTs with terms ≥ 31 business days are in scope.
- The payment of the buy-in / cash compensation is asymmetrical and can only be paid in one direction.

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\(^1\) As determined by Article 4(6)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 (MiFIR)
How is cash compensation determined?

- If the buy-in is not successfully executed within the prescribed timeline (4 business days for liquid equities and seven business days for all other securities), the receiving (non-failing) party can opt to attempt the buy-in one more time (called “the deferral period”).

- If the receiving party either chooses not to opt for deferral or the buy-in still cannot be executed successfully during the deferral period, the buy-in will be settled through “cash compensation” (i.e. cash settlement).

- The original trade will be canceled, and a cash payment is settled between the parties based on a “market value”.

- The market value is determined in one of three ways:
  - on the basis of the closing price of the most relevant market in terms of liquidity;
  - the value determined on the basis of the closing price of the trading venue within the EU with the highest turnover;
  - on the basis of a price calculated using a pre-determined methodology approved by the competent authority of the CSD that refers to criteria related to market data, including market prices available across trading venues or investment firms.

1 The regulation suggests that this payment is asymmetric and can only be paid from the failing delivering party to the non-failing receiving party.
What is the scope of CSDR Settlement Discipline?

- Settlement Discipline will apply to all transactions intended to settle on an EU CSD\(^1\) in transferable securities, money-market instruments, units in collective investment undertakings, and emissions allowances,\(^2\) which are admitted to trading or traded on a trading venue or cleared by a CCP.\(^3\)

- This will apply to all trading level entities regardless of their domicile, that enter into such transactions that settle on an EU CSD, whether directly as CSD members, or indirectly via a settlement or clearing agent (a “CSD participant”).

- It is important to note that initiating the CSDR buy-in process is a regulatory requirement and not a right.

- Securities financing transactions (SFTs) are in scope of settlement discipline.\(^4\)

- SFTs with terms \(\leq 30\) business days are out of scope of mandatory buy-ins.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Articles 1(1) and 1(2)
\(^2\) Article 5(1)
\(^3\) Article 7(10)
\(^4\) Article 7(4)(b)
\(^5\) RTS: Article 22(2)
Ensuring enforcement of CSDR mandatory buy-ins

- The RTS outline provisions to ensure that all parties in the settlement chain are brought into scope of the CSDR mandatory buy-in requirements, \textit{regardless of their jurisdiction or domicile}:

RTS: Article 25

\begin{itemize}
  \item Contractual arrangements and procedures
    \begin{enumerate}
    \item Parties in the settlement chain shall establish contractual arrangements with their relevant counterparties that incorporate the buy-in process requirements specified in paragraph 2 and the procedures specified in paragraph 3.
    \item The contractual arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 shall fully incorporate the applicable requirements set out in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 and Articles 26 to 38 of this Regulation. Each party in the settlement chain shall ensure that the contractual arrangements established with its relevant counterparties are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions.
    \item CCPs, clearing members, trading venue members or trading parties shall establish the necessary procedures to execute the buy-in, pay the cash compensation, the price difference and the buy-in costs within the required timeframes. The contractual arrangements and the procedures referred to in this Article shall include the necessary provisions to ensure that the relevant parties in the settlement chain receive the information required to exercise their rights and obligations in accordance with the timeframes specified in Articles 26 to 35 of this Regulation.
    \item The participants shall establish the necessary contractual arrangements with their clients to ensure that the buy-in requirements set out in this Regulation are enforceable in all the jurisdictions to which parties in the settlement chain belong.
    \end{enumerate}
\end{itemize}
### Key differences between ICMA Buy-in Rules and CSDR mandatory buy-ins

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<tr>
<th>ICMA Buy-in Rules</th>
<th>CSDR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discretionary: can be initiated at any time from ISD+1</td>
<td>Mandatory: must be initiated following ISD+4 (liquid equities) or ISD+7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-defaulting party can elect time between notification and date of buy-in (4 to 10 days)</td>
<td>Non-defaulting party must start buy-in process following the extension period</td>
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<td>Buy-in process can run indefinitely</td>
<td>Buy-in must be completed in 4 or 7 business days, with option to attempt (‘defer’) for one more attempt</td>
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<td>No requirement to appoint a buy-in agent</td>
<td>Requirement to appoint a buy-in agent</td>
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<td>Buy-in differential (buy-in price vs original price) is paid in either direction between seller and buyer depending on which is higher/lower.</td>
<td>Buy-in differential payment is asymmetrical and is only paid by the seller to the buyer where the buy-in price is higher. Where it is lower, the differential is “deemed paid”.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cash compensation is possible, but not prescribed.</td>
<td>Cash compensation is prescribed (also asymmetrically)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pass-on mechanism to provide for single buy-in to settle settlement chains</td>
<td>No pass-on mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Applies to all firms trading under ICMA Rules (usually members) in ‘international securities’. The ICMA Rules form part of the contractual trading agreements between member firms.</td>
<td>Applies to all transactions intended to settle on an EU/EEA CSD in transferable securities, money-market instruments, units in collective investment undertakings, and emissions allowances, which are admitted to trading or traded on a trading venue or cleared by a CCP.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

[1] Defined as a security intended to be traded on an international, cross-border basis (i.e. between parties in different countries), and capable of settlement through an international central securities depository or equivalent.
The CSDR mandatory buy-in asymmetry

Level 1: Article 7(6)

Without prejudice to the penalty mechanism referred to in paragraph 2, where the price of the shares agreed at the time of the trade is higher* than the price paid for the execution of the buy-in, the corresponding difference shall be paid to the receiving participant by the failing participant no later than on the second business day after the financial instruments have been delivered following the buy-in.

RTS: Article 35

Payment of the price difference

1. Where the price of financial instruments referred to in Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 agreed at the time of the trade is lower than the price effectively paid for those financial instruments pursuant to Articles 27(10), 29(10), and 31(10), the failing clearing members, failing trading venue members or failing trading parties shall pay the price difference to the CCP, receiving trading venue members or receiving trading parties, as applicable. Where transactions are cleared by a CCP, the price difference referred to in the first subparagraph shall be collected from failing clearing members by the CCP and paid to the receiving clearing members.

2. Where the price of the shares agreed at the time of the trade is higher than the price effectively paid for those shares pursuant to Article 27(10), Article 29(10) and Article 31(10), the corresponding difference referred to in Article 7(6) of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 shall be deemed paid.

* Footnote added by ICMA. This would normally be expected to read “lower”, rather than “higher”, to be consistent with market practice. In the case that the price agreed at the time of the trade is higher than the price paid for the execution of the buy-in, the corresponding difference is normally paid by the receiving party to the failing party.
Outline

- What are the challenges for firms caught under the buy-in regime, and what are ICMA and others doing about it?
Challenges

- **Scope and application**
  - Certain SFTs (open, basket trades)?
  - How to buy-in an SFT?
  - Margin/collateral movements?
  - Finding a buy-in agent?
  - Pass-ons / multiple buy-ins?
  - Establishing the appropriate reference price ("market value") for cash compensation?
  - Dispute resolution?

- **Enforceability**
  - Contractual arrangements (Article 25)?
  - Extraterritorial application?
  - Monitoring and sanctions?

- **Impacts for market liquidity**
  - Bond markets?
  - Repo and securities lending markets?
What is ICMA doing about CSDR buy-ins? Implementation: Bond markets

- Updating the **ICMA buy-in rules** to be CSDR compliant:*  
  - Providing a contractual framework and market best practice to support implementation  
  - Providing contractual solutions to some of the regulation’s more problematic challenges

- **Addressing the asymmetric payment provisions** for buy-in and cash compensation  
  - Working with ESMA to provide Q&A that allows for symmetrical payments through contractual agreements (such as the ICMA buy-in rules)

- In March 2020, ICMA submitted Q&As to ESMA outlining the cross-industry buy-in pass-on mechanism to enhance the CSDR buy-in process. The submission is in the form of two separate Q&As: (i) a **pass-on mechanism between failing transactions with the same intended settlement date**; and (ii) a **pass-on mechanism between failing transactions that may have different intended settlement dates**. These proposals were developed as a cross-industry effort, led by ICMA and AFME, and are based on existing mechanisms widely used in the non-cleared markets (such as under the ICMA Buy-in Rules).

- ICMA has created a workstream to explore possible best practice for establishing the appropriate reference price in the case of cash compensation.

* ICMA has created a CSDR Legal Workstream to facilitate the necessary contractual revisions for cash and SFTs
ICMA: CSDR-SD mandatory buy-ins

What is ICMA doing about CSDR buy-ins?

- Updating the GMRA to cover in-scope SFTs*
- Working with ISLA to establish **best practice for SFTs** in the case of fails
- In March 2020, published **FAQs on CSDR mandatory buy-ins and Securities Financing Transactions**. The FAQs are intended to outline considerations and, where possible, to provide clarity with respect to the application of CSDR buy-ins in the case of repos and other SFTs. The FAQs will be updated in light of new guidance from ESMA and agreed market best practice.
- Working with ISLA to propose appropriate **exemptions for certain SFTs**:
  - In February 2020, ICMA and ISLA, on behalf of the European repo and securities lending community, submitted a Q&A to ESMA requesting Level 3 guidance that open, and open-like, SFTs should be exempted from the CSDR buy-in requirements based on their earliest contractual termination date. This is in line with other regulatory treatments (e.g. for LCR and NSFR purposes) as well as general accounting practice. The results of a survey of ERCC and ISLA members on their treatment of open SFTs was also shared with ESMA.
  - ICMA, jointly with ISLA, plans to submit Q&As requesting an exemption for certain basket trades (triparty and DBV).

* ICMA has created a CSDR Legal Workstream to facilitate the necessary contractual revisions for cash and SFTs
ICMA: CSDR-SD mandatory buy-ins

What is ICMA doing about CSDR buy-ins? Advocacy

- Raising awareness of scope, details, and potential implications.
  - In particular non-EU entities and smaller buy-sides

- Continuing advocacy with regulators and policy makers with a view to delaying/amending the CSDR mandatory buy-in provisions.
  - ICMA’s position is that cash penalties should be made more punitive as a less disruptive alternative to applying the mandatory buy-in regime
  - ICMA undertook a 2nd Bond Market Impact Study in fall 2019 (following the previous study of 2015)
  - In January 2020, ICMA joined a cross-industry initiatives to request that the European Commission and co-legislators consider deferring implementation of the buy-in regime (until an assessment of the impact of penalties, as well as a detailed, quantitative analysis of potential impacts of the regime).
  - ICMA’s Asset Management and Investors Council (AMIC) is also working with other buy-side associations to raise the concerns of the European and international asset management industry.
ICMA Buy-in Rules

- ICMA will update its Buy-in Rules (part of the ICMA Secondary Market Rules & Recommendations) to align with the regulatory requirements.

- The ICMA Rules cover transactions in international securities (i.e. securities intended to be traded on a cross-border basis and capable of being settled on an ICSD).

- The ICMA Rules apply automatically between members and/or are incorporated by reference in firms’ terms of business.

- The updated ICMA Buy-in Rules will serve as a contractual framework and market best practice to help support implementation in the international bond markets.

- The Buy-in Rules will also seek to solve for a number of shortcomings in the regulatory provisions (e.g. allowing for symmetrical payments of the buy-in/cash compensation differential and the possibility of a ‘pass-on’ mechanism).

ICMA intends to consult with members and the broader industry on the proposed revisions to the Buy-in Rules in early 2020 (following further clarifications from ESMA).
What are the potential implications for bond market functioning and liquidity?
ICMA’s 3rd study into the state and evolution of the European IG corporate bond secondary market*

*Final report published in March 2020

In the next 3 years, what impact do you expect the following factors or initiatives to have on market liquidity, where -5 is very negative, +5 is very positive, and 0 is neutral?

**Sell-side**

Impacts on liquidity: next 3 years

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**Buy-side**

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ICMA Bond Market Impact Study (2019)

- Follows up on ICMA’s 2015 Bond Market Impact Study

- Study sets out to answer five questions with respect to the CSDR mandatory buy-in regime:
  1. What is the general preparedness of firms both from an operational and trading strategy perspective?
  2. How will sell-sides adjust their pricing and liquidity provision across a range of bond sub-classes?
  3. What are the expectations of buy-sides with respect to pricing and market liquidity?
  4. What are the likely impacts for repo and securities lending?
  5. What possible refinements or enhancement to the framework could help to mitigate the risks of unintended consequences?

- Methodology
  - Survey based with three survey templates: sell-side, buy-side, repo and securities lending desks
  - 44 responses, representing buy-side firms (16), sell-side firms (16), and repo and securities lending desks (12).

- Focus is on euro bond markets, but impacts are expected to extend to all securities settled on EU (I)CSDs
Awareness and preparedness

**Market awareness**

- Broad awareness: 10%
- Limited awareness: 70%
- Very little awareness: 20%

**Plans to adapt operational processes**

- Yes: 70%
- No: 10%
- Not sure: 20%

**Plans to adapt risk management and trading**

- Yes: 60%
- No: 20%
- Not sure: 20%
Sell-side pricing and liquidity

Impact on bid-ask spreads

Expected capacity to show offers
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Buy-side expectations

Expected impact to offer-side pricing

- Sov core
- Sov periphery
- Sups agency
- Covered bonds
- IG credit (liquid)
- HG credit (liquid)
- HY
- EM

Expected impact on market efficiency and liquidity

- Improve
- Same
- Worse
- Significantly worse
- Not sure
- N/A
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Repo and securities lending

Expected impact on lending securities

- No change/as normal
- As normal but more expensive
- Less likely to offer
- No offer

Expected impact on SFT market efficiency and liquidity

- Improve
- Little or no impact
- Worsen
- Worsen significantly
Possible enhancements

Sell-side

- Remove the asymmetry
- Provide for pass-ons
- Remove requirement to appoint a buy-in agent
- Provide for a longer extension period (e.g., 30 days)
- Remove mandatory requirement for illiquid bonds
- Remove mandatory requirement for all bonds
- Fully exempt SFTs

Buy-side

- Remove the asymmetry
- Provide for pass-ons
- Remove requirement to appoint a buy-in agent
- Provide for a longer extension period (e.g., 30 days)
- Remove mandatory requirement for illiquid bonds
- Remove mandatory requirement for all bonds
- Fully exempt SFTs

Assessment of possible enhancements to the regulation

- Help significantly
- Some help
- No impact
- Not sure

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Expected impact on investor protection

- Improve: 20%
- Same: 25%
- Worse: 15%
- Significantly worse: 10%
ICMA: CSDR-SD mandatory buy-ins

Conclusions

- CSDR focuses on the authorization and regulation of EU (I)CSDs, however the Settlement Discipline measures extend to firms settling trades on EU (I)CSDs. These include cash penalties for fails and a mandatory buy-in regime.

- The CSDR mandatory buy-in regime imposes a legal obligation for trading level entities to issue buy-ins against failing parties (following a specified extension period).

- The buy-in regime is intended to apply to all trading level parties regardless of location or jurisdiction. This includes any non-EU firm settling trades on EU (I)CSDs. The regulation requires that firms have in place contractual arrangements to ensure that the regulatory provisions are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions.

- ICMA (and other industry bodies) are working on solutions and enhancements to support implementation. ICMA will update its Buy-in Rules to provide a contractual framework and best practice for implementation in the international bond markets.

- The regime is expected to have significant negative implications for bond market functioning, liquidity, and stability.

- The Settlement Discipline regime is currently due to come into force in September 2020 (but may be slightly delayed).
ICMA: CSDR-SD mandatory buy-ins

Resources

- March 2020: ICMA FAQs on CSDR mandatory buy-ins and SFTs
- November 2019: ICMA CSDR buy-in impact study for EU bond markets
- August 2019: ICMA information brochure on CSD Regulation mandatory buy-ins
- June 2018: How to survive in a mandatory buy-in world
- May 2017: ICMA Position Paper on CSDR Settlement Discipline


ICMA: CSDR-SD mandatory buy-ins